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THE BFOQ DEFENSE: TITLE VII'S CONCESSION TO GENDER 
DISCRIMINATION 
KATIE MANLEY* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employers from 
discriminating against employees when making employment decisions.1 
Nevertheless, when employers do partake in discriminatory decision-making, 
they are offered the statutory defense of the bona fide occupational qualification 
(BFOQ). The BFOQ defense allows employers to intentionally discriminate 
based on gender by adopting an otherwise facially discriminatory employment 
practice if reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the business.2 While 
the Supreme Court has held that this defense should be interpreted narrowly, it 
is still available if employers are able to prove that all or substantially all of the 
members of one gender cannot successfully perform the job duties essential to 
fulfill the employer's primary business function.3 If an employer is successful in 
offering the defense, gender discrimination is legally permitted. Thus, by 
utilizing the BFOQ defense, employers are permitted to partake in the exact 
discriminatory practices that Title VII directly seeks to forbid. Accordingly, Title 
VII seems to acknowledge that under certain circumstances discrimination 
really is acceptable. However, a deeper examination of these circumstances 
invites the question: Should the BFOQ exception still exist? 
Because permitting discrimination under Title VII seems fundamentally 
contrary to the anti-discrimination purpose of the statute, this article questions 
whether the BFOQ defense is consistent with the aims of Title VII or whether, in 
actuality, the defense undermines the Act's effectiveness by providing a 
loophole for employers to participate in the discriminatory practices Title VII 
seeks to forbid. In the end, this article considers four differing viewpoints on the 
BFOQ defense: (1) the BFOQ defense should be broadened to represent the 
needs of society and the practices that some courts already permit; (2) the 
defense should remain as is because it appropriately balances customer and 
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 1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). 
 3. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977). 
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employer rights against employee rights; (3) the defense is necessary in very 
limited circumstances, but the exception should be narrowed to permit 
discrimination only in the utmost imperative circumstances; and (4) the BFOQ 
defense is inconsistent with the aims of Title VII and should no longer be 
permitted. 
Although the BFOQ exception is permitted for both religion and national 
origin, it is most commonly and most controversially utilized in gender 
discrimination suits.4 Therefore, this note will focus solely on the defense as 
applied to gender discrimination cases. Part I begins by providing general 
information on the BFOQ defense, including a discussion of the BFOQ 
framework and the history of the defense. Part II examines the successful and 
unsuccessful use of the defense, exploring when employers' motives have 
achieved or failed to meet the BFOQ requirements. Part III discusses the 
inconsistencies that have occurred in the application of this defense. Because the 
BFOQ is available in gender discrimination, but not in race discrimination, Part 
IV looks to the reasons Congress provided a gender BFOQ. In response, Part V 
posits on the actual and perceived differences between men and women and 
considers if any significant differences exist that validate Title VII's 
authorization of gender discrimination. Part VI then questions whether the 
defense to gender discrimination should still be available. Arguments both for 
and against the BFOQ defense are presented, with special thought paid to the 
question of whether the defense is actually consistent with Title VII. Finally, this 
article concludes that the defense, though unquestionably problematic in theory 
and application, is a necessary component for the workability of Title VII. 
II.  BACKGROUND OF THE BFOQ DEFENSE 
A. Jurisprudence 
The BFOQ defense is a statutory defense available under Section 703 of 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.5 Title VII is the primary federal statute 
providing protection against workplace discrimination, mandating: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or refuse to 
hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any 
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of 
employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin.6 
The Act covers a wide range of employment discrimination claims, 
including those based on hiring, firing, promotion, and conditions or benefits of 
employment.7 Title VII was enacted in 1964 to "prohibit all practices in whatever 
form which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination 
 
 4. MACK A. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 285–86 (student ed. 1988). 
 5. § 2000e-2(e). 
 6. § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 7. Id. 
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on the basis of race, religion, sex, or national origin."8 The bona fide occupational 
qualification defense in Title VII allows intentional discrimination in some 
circumstances, stating: 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter . . . it shall not be an 
unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and employ 
employees . . . on the basis of his religion, sex, or national origin in those certain 
instances where religion, sex, or national origin is a bona fide occupational 
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business or enterprise.9 
Although the defense is available for gender, religion, and national origin-
based hiring, it is not available in race discrimination cases.10 This suggests that 
Title VII's framers believed that racial discrimination was somehow different 
than discrimination based upon gender; a belief that it was more valuable or 
important to protect against racial discrimination. 
The legislative history of the BFOQ defense is limited, sometimes causing 
courts to struggle with its interpretation.11 The lack of legislative history is 
partially due to the fact that sex discrimination, the main type of case to utilize 
the BFOQ, was not originally included in the statutory language of Title VII.12 
Instead, Title VII was originally enacted to prevent race, color, origin, and 
religious discrimination in employment.13 In a last minute attempt to defeat the 
legislation, a House Representative who opposed the bill proposed that the bill 
be broadened to include sex in the list of protected categories.14 The House 
Judiciary Committee did not hold a hearing on the amendment to add gender 
discrimination to Title VII and little discussion of the addition ensued.15 This 
effort to thwart the passage of Title VII was unsuccessful, and the bill passed 
with the inclusion of sex as a protected category.16 As a result, the legislative 
history of the sex discrimination portion of Title VII and the BFOQ defense is 
nearly nonexistent. Even the Supreme Court has recognized this limitation, 
stating, "we are left with little legislative history to guide us in interpreting the 
Act's prohibition against discrimination based on 'sex.'"17 
 
 8. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976). 
 9. § 2000e-2(e)(1). 
 10. Id. 
 11. See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1986) (explaining that there is little 
legislative history available on the BFOQ defense); Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 
292, 297 (N.D. Tex. 1981) (stating that "Congress provided sparse evidence of its intent when 
enacting the BFOQ exception to Title VII."). 
 12. Meritor Sav. Bank, 477 U.S. at 63–64. 
 13. Id. 
 14. See W. PEPPER & F. KENNEDY, SEX DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT: AN ANALYSIS AND 
GUIDE FOR PRACTITIONER AND STUDENT 18 (1981) (discussing the fact that the addition of "sex" to the 
list of prohibited classification was added in an attempt to prevent the bill). See also Willingham v. 
Macon Tel. Publ'g. Co., 507 F.2d 1084, 1090 (5th Cir. 1975) (explaining that the amendment adding 
"sex" to the list was a last minute attempt to sabotage the bill). 
 15. See Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 297 n.12. 
 16. Id. at 297. 
 17. Meritor, 477 U.S. at 64. 
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Nevertheless, the Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII, submitted by the 
Senate Floor Managers of the Civil Rights Bill, does provide some limited 
information on the BFOQ.18 The Interpretive Memorandum refers to the BFOQ 
as a "limited exception" to the prohibition against discrimination and explains 
that employers are given a "limited right to discriminate . . . where the reason for 
the discrimination is a bona fide occupational qualification."19 This 
Memorandum further detailed some examples of BFOQs that would entail legal 
discrimination, including "the preference of a French restaurant for a French 
cook, the preference of a professional baseball team for male players, and the 
preference of a business which seeks the patronage of members of a particular 
religious group for a salesman of the religion. . . ."20 While this memo provides 
some instruction on appropriate BFOQ exceptions, it does not provide the in-
depth understanding necessary to identify the appropriate circumstances in 
which the defense may be used. 
Although the EEOC guidelines are also not extensive, they have been 
crucial in the courts' understanding of the defense since the statute itself offers 
little guidance. The EEOC guidelines echo Title VII's directive that "the [BFOQ] 
exception as to sex should be interpreted narrowly."21 The guidelines further 
explain that employers many not refuse to hire employees based on stereotyped 
characterizations or customer preferences.22 The compliance manual lists only 
one area in which a BFOQ is allowable: when necessary for the purpose of 
authenticity or genuineness.23 Nevertheless, EEOC discussion letters explain 
that other motives, including the psychological needs of clients or customers, are 
acceptable BFOQ objectives.24 
Although the EEOC guidelines provide guidance to courts interpreting the 
BFOQ provision, they are not controlling precedent. In General Electric Co. v 
Gilbert, the Supreme Court considered how much deference to give the EEOC's 
guidelines, explaining that: 
[T]he rulings, interpretations and opinions of the [EEOC] under this Act, while 
not controlling upon the courts by reason of their authority, do constitute a body 
of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may 
properly resort for guidance.25 
The court went on to find two crucial factors in determining whether a 
court should defer to EEOC guidelines: (1) whether the guideline in question is a 
contemporaneous interpretation of Title VII, and (2) whether the guideline is 
consistent or inconsistent with the position that the EEOC held at an earlier date, 
 
 18. Wilson, 517 F. Supp. at 297 (citing 110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964)). 
 19. Id. (quoting 110 CONG. REC. 7212, 7213 (1964)). 
 20. Id. 
 21. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2008). 
 22. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii)-(iii). 
 23. § 1604.2(a)(2). 
 24. See EEOC Informal Discussion Letter, Aug. 22, 2005 (available at http://www.eeoc.gov/ 
foia/letters/2005/titlevii_bfoq_psychotherapy.html); see also EEOC Informal Discussion Letter, 
March 2, 2002 (available at http://www.eeoc.gov/foia/letters/2002/titlevii_bfoq.html). 
 25. 429 U.S. 125, 141–42 (1976) (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)). 
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closer to the enactment of Title VII.26 These factors suggest that courts should 
defer to EEOC's BFOQ guidelines because: (1) the guidelines have been 
consistent, not changing since their promulgation,27 and (2) they were 
promulgated very close in time to the enactment of Title VII (the same year, in 
fact). Thus, courts can place great weight on the EEOC's guidelines when 
deciding BFOQ cases. 
B. Framework 
A plaintiff may bring a Title VII claim by asserting a violation based on 
disparate treatment or disparate impact. Under a disparate treatment claim, an 
individual argues that he or she was treated differently as a result of his or her 
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Under this theory, proof of the 
employer's discriminatory motive is essential.28 Alternatively, under a claim of 
disparate impact, the employment practice appears neutral on its face, but 
impacts a protected group more harshly.29 Because the practice is facially 
neutral, no proof of discriminatory motive is required. The BFOQ defense is 
utilized only when an employer admits to discriminatory practices and, 
therefore, should only be raised as a defense to disparate treatment charges. 
To establish the prima facie case for disparate treatment, a plaintiff must 
show that: (1) he is a member of a protected class; (2) he applied and was 
qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) despite his 
qualifications, he was rejected; and (4) that, after his rejection, the position 
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons 
with complainant's qualifications.30 Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie 
case, the burden shifts to the defendant employer to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for the employee's rejection.31 An employer may state a 
variety of legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons, provided that they are not 
pretext.32 Moreover, the employer's justifications do not have to be good 
reasons, so long as they are non-discriminatory.33 It is sufficient if the defendant 
raises a genuine issue of material fact as to whether it discriminated against the 
plaintiff.34 According to the Supreme Court in Texas Department of Community 
Affairs v. Burdine, the employer must only "produce admissible evidence which 
would allow the trier of fact rationally to conclude that the employment decision 
had not been motivated by discriminatory animus."35 The plaintiff retains the 
burden of persuasion and may succeed "either directly by persuading the court 
 
 26. Id. at 142. 
 27. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 299 n.15 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 28. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 803–05 (1973). 
 29. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446 (1982). 
 30. McDonnell Douglass, 411 U.S at 802. This basic prima facie case framework is modified to fit 
other employment actions, including promotion, firing, and unequal conditions or privileges of 
employment. 
 31. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. at 257–58. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 257. 
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that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by 
showing that the employer's offered explanation is unworthy of credence."36 The 
plaintiff's successfully established prima facie case, joined with sufficient 
evidence that the employer's proffered justification was false, permits the trier of 
fact to conclude that unlawful discrimination occurred.37 
If a plaintiff is successful in making out her prima facie case, an employer 
then has the opportunity to raise the BFOQ as an affirmative defense. Here, the 
burden of proof falls upon the employer and is difficult to meet.38 Both the 
Supreme Court and the EEOC guidelines explain that the BFOQ exception to sex 
discrimination should be interpreted narrowly;39 a BFOQ can be established 
only when "sex discrimination is 'reasonably necessary' to the 'normal 
operations' of the 'particular' business."40 
C. The BFOQ Multi-Part Test 
The requirements for establishing a BFOQ have evolved over time into a 
multi-part test, guided by Supreme Court cases and the BFOQ rules established 
within the Age Discrimination Employment Act.41 Courts considering a BFOQ 
defense analyze the claim under the "all or substantially all" test and the 
"essence of business" test.42 Additionally, courts often consider whether any 
reasonable alternatives exist to forgo discriminatory practices.43 
Initially, courts constructing a BFOQ standard required that an employer 
prove that "all or substantially all women" would be unable to fulfill the 
requisite job duties. For example, in Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph 
Co., an employer excluded women from positions requiring employees to lift 
more than thirty pounds.44 This practice was rejected because the employer 
could not show that almost all women could not lift thirty pounds.45 The Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals explained that "to rely on the bona fide occupational 
qualification exception an employer has the burden of proving that he had 
reasonable cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or 
substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the 
duties of the job involved."46 The "all or substantially all" test often comes into 
dispute when employers attempt to exclude females based on physical ability, 
privacy concerns, or where pregnancy poses safety risks. This test presents a 
 
 36. Id. at 256. 
 37. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). 
 38. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 248 (1989) (explaining that "[w]hen an 
employer has asserted that gender is a BFOQ within the meaning of § 703(e), for example, we have 
assumed that it is the employer who must show why it must use gender as a criterion in 
employment"). 
 39. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991); 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a) (2008). 
 40. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 201. 
 41. 1 BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 404 (4th 
ed., 2007). 
 42. Id. at 405. 
 43. Id. 
 44. 408 F.2d 228, 232–34 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 45. Id. at 235–36. 
 46. Id at 235. 
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large hurdle for employers and is only met if it can be shown that gender is an 
"absolute bar to job performance or if virtually all members of one sex are 
unable to perform and testing for individual capabilities is not feasible."47 This 
"all or substantially all" test makes up one prong of the three part test commonly 
employed today. 
Two years after establishing the "all or substantially all" test, the Fifth 
Circuit Court of Appeals formulated another test, commonly called the "essence 
of the business" test, to determine whether a BFOQ was properly established.48 
In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., Pan Am maintained a policy of 
exclusively hiring females for its flight attendant positions.49 The essence of the 
business test was established with the court's finding that "[d]iscrimination 
based on sex is valid only when the essence of the business operation would be 
undermined by not hiring members of one sex exclusively."50 Although the 
court acknowledged that females may be better suited to fulfill the required 
duties of the position, this was not enough to fulfill the essence of the business 
test: 
The primary function of an airline is to transport passengers safely from one 
point to another. While a pleasant environment, enhanced by the obvious 
cosmetic effect that female stewardesses provide as well as . . . their apparent 
ability to perform the non-mechanical functions of the job in a more effective 
manner than most men, may all be important, they are tangential to the essence 
of the business involved. No one has suggested that having male stewards will 
so seriously affect the operation of an airline as to jeopardize or even minimize 
its ability to provide safe transportation from one place to another.51 
Consequently, job qualifications cannot be based on customer, coworker, or 
employer preference. Furthermore, an employer's decrease in profits is not 
adequate to support a BFOQ defense.52 In light of these restrictions, the essence 
of the business test is considerably difficult to meet. An employer must prove 
that gender is absolutely essential to the business' primary function and that 
members of the opposite gender could not successfully perform the duties that 
constitute the employer's essence of the business. 
For many years, the "all or substantially all" and the "essence of the 
business" tests were utilized as separate and competing BFOQ tests. However, 
in 1977, in Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court gave express approval to 
both standards.53 After the Supreme Court authorized the use of both analyses, 
courts began to employ the "all or substantially all" and the "essence of the 
business" concurrently. The two tests are easily employed in tandem because 
they focus on two different considerations. The "essence of the business" test 
considers whether the employee's desired trait is essential for the business to 
 
 47. Stephen F. Befort, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of the Defense to 
Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 16 (1991). 
 48. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 409. 
 49. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 50. Id. at 388. 
 51. Id. 
 52. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292, 302 n.25 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 53. 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). 
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run successfully, while the "all or substantially all" test focuses on whether a 
class-based ban is the only feasible method of revealing those unable to perform 
the job. 
Often, courts require a third prerequisite, mandating that defendants also 
show that no reasonable, less discriminatory alternative exists, especially in 
cases where privacy is at issue.54 For instance, in Hardin v. Stynchcomb, the 
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals disallowed the sheriff's department's policy 
of rejecting female applicants for the deputy sheriff position.55 There, the 
sheriff's department argued that sex was a bona fide occupational qualification 
for the job because the available positions were in the male section of the jail.56 
In rejecting the BFOQ defense, the court explained that the defendant had not 
met its burden of proving that it "could not rearrange job responsibilities in a 
way that would eliminate the clash between the privacy interests of the inmates 
and the employment opportunities of female deputy sheriffs."57 
III.  EMPLOYER USE OF THE BFOQ DEFENSE 
Employers attempt to evoke the BFOQ defense in a variety of contexts. 
However, given that the BFOQ exception is intended to be extremely narrow, 
employers' efforts are typically rejected. The defense is generally only successful 
in three main contexts: privacy, safety, and authenticity. While employers may, 
at times, legally engage in discriminatory hiring practices as a result of these 
three concerns, almost any other motive will be refuted. Though gendered 
hiring regularly occurs based on stereotypes, customer preference, and the 
promotion of sex appeal within businesses that don't primarily sell sex, 
employers have been largely unsuccessful in justifying discriminatory hiring 
stemming from these motives. The following assessment of successful and 
unsuccessful uses of the defense allows an examination of the defense's 
legitimacy and assists in explaining whether its tolerance of discriminatory 
practices should remain unchanged, be expanded, or restricted. 
A. Successful BFOQ Contexts 
1. Privacy 
Employers are often successful in offering BFOQ defenses based on 
legitimate privacy concerns. Although the Supreme Court has never heard a 
BFOQ privacy case, it has suggested that such a justification may be one of the 
few acceptable BFOQ motives.58 Courts of appeal and lower courts regularly 
 
 54. See LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 41, at 412. 
 55. 691 F.2d 1364 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 56. Id. at 1366. 
 57. Id. at 1370–74. 
 58. See Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 206 n.4 (1991) (noting that "[n]othing 
in our discussion of the 'essence of business test,' however, suggests that sex could not constitute a 
BFOQ when privacy interests are implicated"). 
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recognize this defense when based upon the privacy concerns of third parties.59 
Courts differ in their determinations of what privacy interests are legitimate, but 
most successful claims are premised upon concerns for bodily privacy when 
dealing with fully or partially unclothed patients or customers. A subset of cases 
based upon the needs of patients when receiving psychological or role-modeling 
services are often considered to fall under the privacy exception. The primary 
factor in privacy cases is whether the protection of the privacy interests is 
essential to the employer's primary business.60 
An employer arguing a BFOQ defense based on privacy must generally 
establish three elements: "(1) it has a factual basis for believing that employees of 
a particular sex are necessary in order to protect the privacy interests of third 
parties involved; (2) the asserted privacy interest is entitled to protection under 
the law; and (3) there is no reasonable alternative to protect those privacy 
interests other than a sex-based policy."61 In analyzing the third prong of the 
test, courts will question whether employers can rearrange job assignments to 
prevent privacy problems.62 If such alterations are possible, a BFOQ defense is 
more likely to be denied. 
Privacy defenses have been upheld in instances where employers require 
custodians to be the same sex as those in the facility being cleaned, nurses and 
care providers in hospitals and nursing homes to be of the same sex as patients 
being assisted, and labor and delivery nurses to be female.63 Courts are often 
lenient in permitting BFOQs in health care situations.64 In Fesel v. Masonic Home 
of Delaware, Inc., for example, a court considered sex-based hiring permissible, 
finding that being a woman was a legitimate BFOQ for an orderly since the 
patients would not consent to male workers bathing them or providing any 
other intimate-contact services.65 
Though privacy-based BFOQ cases often arise in prison settings, the 
defense is much more likely to be denied in that environment, in part because of 
the lower value courts place on the privacy rights of prisoners. Nonetheless, 
courts may still require that prisons rearrange job responsibilities or alter the 
environment in order to provide privacy to prisoners during intrusive 
situations. For example, in Forts v. Ward, female prisoners complained of privacy 
concerns resulting from the staffing of male guards in female housing units 
when "inmates were involuntarily exposed to view while partially or completely 
 
 59. See Jillian B. Berman, Comment, Defining the "Essence of the Business:" An Analysis of Title VII's 
Privacy BFOQ after Johnson Controls, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 749, 752–53 (2000). 
 60. LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 42 at 421. 
 61. Id. at 418. 
 62. See, e.g., Olsen v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d. 1052 (D. Ariz. 1999) (finding that being a 
female was not a BFOQ for a massage therapist position because of the reasonable alternative that 
clients could choose the sex of their therapist). 
 63. See generally Berman, supra note 59. 
 64. Id. See also Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 
591 F.2d. 1334 (3d Cir. 1979); Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Jones v. 
Hinds Gen. Hosp., 666 F. Supp. 933 (S.D. Miss. 1987); EEOC v. Mercy Health Ctr., No. CIV-80-1374-
W, 1982 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12256 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 2, 1982). 
 65. 447 F. Supp. at 1353–54. 
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unclothed."66 While the court rejected the inmate's BFOQ argument, it 
nonetheless ordered the prison to install shower screens and provide sleeping 
garments for inmates.67 
Both courts and the EEOC have recognized the validity of employers' use 
of a BFOQ defense, falling under the privacy exception, when based upon role 
modeling or counseling. Although the EEOC recognizes that "the psychological 
needs of an employer's clients or customers can make sex a BFOQ," it places 
significant burdens on employers to argue the defense.68 In order for an 
employer to defend based upon the BFOQ, the EEOC mandates "medical 
evidence from the employer that the employer's clients have psychosocial need 
for a same-sex role model," provided by a doctor, psychiatrist, or psychologist.69 
Some courts, however, have been quite lenient in this area, allowing 
employers to succeed with a BFOQ defense without any scientific proof or 
psychological testimony of its necessity.70 For instance, in Healey v. Southwood 
Psychiatric Hospital, a female child-care specialist brought a sex discrimination 
suit against her employer for assigning her the night shift because she was a 
female.71 The hospital in turn argued that it was necessary to have a female on 
shift to care for the sexually abused female patients.72 The Third Circuit agreed, 
finding that role modeling was an important part of the position and that 
workers of the same gender as the patients made better role models.73 The court 
found it important that the essence of Southwood's business was "to treat 
emotionally disturbed and sexually abused adolescents and children."74 
Additionally, the court explained that the hospital was justified in gender-based 
hiring because "children who have been sexually abused will disclose their 
problems more easily to a member of a certain sex, depending on their sex and 
the sex of the abuser."75 Another example of the role modeling defense is 
illustrated in City of Philadelphia v. Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission.76 
There, the City of Philadelphia partook in discriminatory hiring practices by 
restricting supervision of juvenile detainees to employees of the same sex as the 
detainees.77 The court found that objective, empirical evidence was not 
necessary to prove a BFOQ and that common sense evidence would suffice ; "[a] 
common sense [belief] that a young girl with a sexual or emotional problem will 
 
 66. 621 F.2d 1210, 1213 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 67. Id. at 1216–17. 
 68. EEOC Compl. Man. (BNA) § 625.8(a)(2), at 625:0017 (April 1982). 
 69. Id. See also EEOC Dec. LA 68-4-538E, 2 Fair. Empl. Prac. Cases (BNA) 537, 537–38 (1969) 
(stating that a gender BFOQ was not valid when the disputed job position involved only minimal 
interaction between the employee and the supervised children, since the "children's presumed need 
for association with a 'male-image' would not be satisfied by the incumbency of a male at the 
supervisory position at issue herein"). 
 70. See, e.g., Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. Del. 1978). 
 71. 78 F.3d 128, 130 (3d Cir. 1996). 
 72. Id. at 132–33. 
 73. Id. at 134. 
 74. Id. at 132. 
 75. Id. at 133. 
 76. 300 A.2d 97 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1973). 
 77. Id. at 98–99. 
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usually approach someone of her own sex . . . seeking comfort and answers" was 
sufficient to establish a BFOQ. 78 In justifying this decision, the court further 
explained, "to expect a female or male supervisor to gain the confidence of 
troubled youths of the opposite sex in order to be able to alleviate emotional and 
sexual problems is to expect the impossible."79 
As previously discussed, BFOQ defenses are not normally available when 
based upon the privacy concerns of prison inmates. However, if the concerns for 
privacy are based on rehabilitation needs, courts are more likely to permit a 
BFOQ defense. For example, in Torres v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social 
Services, male correctional officers brought suit against the prison for hiring only 
women to work in the women's maximum security prison's living units.80 
Though the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals found that the prisons' 
justifications of prison security and inmate privacy did not qualify as proper 
BFOQ defenses, they affirmed that the motive of inmate rehabilitation did.81 The 
court found that the essence of the prison's business was to rehabilitate its 
prisoners.82 Because a high percentage of the female inmates had been 
physically and sexually abused by men, "the presence of unrelated males in 
living spaces where intimate bodily functions take place [was] a cause of stress 
to females."83 What's more, the Seventh Circuit rejected a requirement of 
empirical evidence, finding instead that deference to the professional judgment 
of the superintendent was of higher importance.84 Though the case was 
remanded to the district court to determine if the rehabilitation rationale was a 
proper BFOQ, the court of appeals sent a strong message that several other 
courts have since followed.85 Thus, within the prison context, privacy needs 
based upon successful rehabilitation hold greater weight than those based on 
privacy alone. 
2. Safety 
Defenses founded on reasonable safety concerns are also permitted by 
courts in rare circumstances. Employers citing a genuine need to protect the 
safety of those other than an affected employee are generally successful in 
establishing a BFOQ.86 However, courts have universally rejected discriminatory 
employment practices when based solely on the safety of the employee, given 
 
 78. Id. at 103 (explaining that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Committee could not "expect 
the City to produce cold, empirical facts"). 
 79. Id. 
 80. 859 F. 2d 1523, 1524 (7th Cir. 1988). 
 81. Id. at 1529–30. 
 82. Id. at 1530. 
 83. Id. at 1531. 
 84. Id. at 1532 (finding it an unfair and unrealistic burden to require the defendants to produce 
objective evidence, from empirical studies or otherwise). 
 85. See, e.g., Robino v. Iranon, 145 F.3d 1109, 1111 (9th Cir. 1998). 
 86. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 
994 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan Am. World Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Burwell v. 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980). 
MANLEY__FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:43:47 PM 
180 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 16:169 2009 
that Title VII vests individuals with the power to take on unsafe tasks.87 
Furthermore, a BFOQ based on the safety of third parties is not proper unless 
the safety is "indispensable to the particular business at issue."88 For example, in 
Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court allowed a safety-based BFOQ after 
finding that the essence of a correction officer's job was to maintain prison 
security.89 Although the Court recognized that "the BFOQ exception [is] in fact 
meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the general prohibition of 
discrimination on the basis of sex," it nevertheless upheld the defense due the 
"peculiarly inhospitable" environment of the prison, characterized by a "jungle 
atmosphere" and "rampant violence."90 
The upholding of a gender BFOQ based on safety is quite rare, however, 
because there are few situations in which an employer can prove that the hiring 
of women is actually unsafe. The only other cases, outside of Dothard, where 
employers have successfully evoked safety BFOQ defenses have been due to 
pregnant women's reduced capabilities. In several cases airline policies 
prohibiting pregnant flight attendants from working have been upheld because 
of the safety concerns created for passengers if pregnant flight attendants could 
not properly perform their roles in emergency situations.91 
One important area of concern within safety-based BFOQ cases involves 
discriminatory hiring in an effort to protect the safety of unborn children. 
Although this is undoubtedly an important interest to protect, courts reject 
BFOQ defenses based on fetal safety concerns because "unconceived fetuses 
of . . . female employees . . . are neither customers nor third parties whose safety 
is essential to the business . . . ."92 For example, in International Union v. Johnson 
Controls, a class of female employees sued their employer because of its fetal-
protection policy that excluded fertile woman from positions found to expose 
unconceived fetuses to harm.93 The fetal-protection policy, in reality, created a 
near blanket prohibition against the placement of women in many positions, 
since the employer considered a woman of any age or status fertile, unless 
medical documentation provided otherwise.94 In rejecting Johnson Controls' 
BFOQ defense, the Supreme Court noted the discrimination present in this 
policy, given that "[f]ertile men, but not fertile women, [were] given a choice as 
 
 87. See, e.g., Crane v. Vision Quest Nat'l, No. 98-4797, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12357 (E.D. Pa. 
2000); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969) (stating, "Title VII 
rejects just this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and instead vests individual 
women with the power to decide whether or not to take on unromantic tasks. Men have always had 
the right to determine whether the incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, 
obnoxious, boring or unromantic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that women 
are now to be on equal footing. We cannot conclude that by including the bona fide occupational 
qualification exception Congress intended to renege on that promise."). 
 88. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991). 
 89. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 335. 
 90. Id. at 334–35. 
 91. See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1984); Harriss v. Pan Am. World 
Airways, 649 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1980); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980); 
Condit v. United Air Lines, Inc., 558 F. 2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1977). 
 92. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 203. 
 93. Id. at 192. 
 94. Id. 
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to whether they wish[ed] to risk their reproductive health for a particular job."95 
Thus, an employer is prohibited from "discriminating against a woman because 
of her capacity to become pregnant unless her reproductive potential prevents 
her from performing the duties of her job."96 Accordingly, gender-based hiring 
attributed to fetal safety concerns will only be upheld under the BFOQ defense if 
an employer can prove that there is a safety risk for someone other than the 
employee or employee's unconceived fetus. This value judgment suggests that 
courts consider non-discriminatory hiring to be of the significant importance, or 
at least of a higher priority than safety concerns for future children. 
3. Authenticity 
In circumstances where gender-based hiring is necessary for the purpose of 
authenticity or genuineness, the courts and the EEOC expressly permit sex-
based BFOQs.97 For example, the EEOC guidelines explicitly permit an 
employer to make a hiring decision based upon gender when selecting an actor 
or actress for the authenticity of the production.98 Here, an employer must still 
pass the three BFOQ tests: (1) that all or substantially all members of the 
opposite gender are unable to perform in the role; (2) that the essence of the 
business would be undermined without the sex-based hiring decisions; and (3) 
that no reasonable alternative to the discriminatory hiring exists. This argument 
may be successful when hiring performers, actors, or other entertainers for 
gender-based roles, and could even be accepted for sexual entertainment roles 
where the selling of sex is not the essence of the employer's business.99 
Nevertheless, this allowance is restrictive and is not meant to shelter those using 
authenticity as a guise for hiring to cater to customer preference or to sell sex 
appeal in non-sex based businesses. For instance, in an action against Joe's Stone 
Crab restaurant, the EEOC filed suit against Joe's, alleging that it discriminated 
against women applicants in its hiring practices.100 Shortly before this suit was 
filed, all 108 food servers were male.101 Joe's argued that its hiring practices were 
not intended to discriminate against women, but instead were employed to 
create an "Old World" ambience modeled after the highest-quality restaurants in 
Europe.102 In rejecting the defense, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals found 
that if the male-only hiring practice was a form of intentional sex discrimination, 
as the district court found on remand, it would not be protected under the 
authenticity exceptions of the BFOQ defense.103 Thus, only in circumstances 
 
 95. Id. at 197. 
 96. Id. at 206. 
 97. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(2) (2008). See, e.g., Button v. Rockefeller, 351 N.Y.S. 2d 488 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1973)(finding that gender-based hiring was necessary for undercover detective assignments); 
Util. Workers v. S. Cal. Edison, 320 F. Supp. 1262, 1265 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
 98. § 1604.2(a)(2). 
 99. See Ann C. McGinley, Babes and Beefcakes: Exclusive Hiring Arrangement and Sexy Dress Codes, 
14 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 257, 269. 
 100. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 101. Id. at 1267. 
 102. Id. at 1270 (explaining that the district court had found that Joe's "sought to emulate Old 
World traditions by creating an ambience in which tuxedo-clad men served its distinctive menu"). 
 103. Id. at 1282–85; E.E.O.C. v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1313 (2001). 
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where discriminatory hiring practices are needed for legitimate and genuine 
authenticity concerns will a BFOQ defense likely be upheld. 
B. Unsuccessful BFOQ Arguments 
Although circumstances falling within the three areas of privacy, safety, 
and authenticity allow employers to make discriminatory hiring decisions, 
courts overwhelmingly find other employer motives to be illegitimate. 
Commonly prohibited motivations for gender-based hiring include stereotypes, 
customer preference, and the promoting of sex appeal in businesses that do not 
primarily sell sex appeal. While these motives may exist individually, it is not 
uncommon for them to act in concert within a single scenario. For example, 
employers often choose to hire men based upon the stereotype that they are 
stronger, as well as to suit customer preferences (since customers also make 
preference decisions based upon the same stereotypes that employers operate 
under). Similarly, an employer hoping to hire females to promote their sex 
appeal would, in reality, likely be doing so because of his belief that the majority 
of customers would prefer women employees. While this note discusses 
stereotypes, customer preference, and the promotion of sex appeal as distinct 
issues, it is clear from the subsequent examples that these motives often work in 
tandem to produce discriminatory hiring practices. 
1. Stereotypes 
Employer defenses of discriminatory hiring practices blatantly based upon 
stereotypes will almost always be rejected. Permitting a sex-based defense 
founded upon stereotypes would blatantly conflict with Title VII's purpose "to 
overcome stereotyped thinking about the job abilities of the sexes."104 Courts 
have also cited concerns over stereotypes based on paternalistic beliefs that 
women should be protected from dangerous and stressful work environments: 
Title VII rejects [] this type of romantic paternalism as unduly Victorian and 
instead vests individual women with the power to decide whether or not to take 
on unromantic tasks. Men have always had the right to determine whether the 
incremental increase in remuneration for strenuous, dangerous, obnoxious, 
boring or unromantic tasks is worth the candle. The promise of Title VII is that 
women are now to be on equal footing. We cannot conclude that by including 
the bona fide occupational qualification exception Congress intended to renege 
on that promise.105 
The EEOC guidelines also prohibit stereotypes as valid BFOQs, stating that 
"[t]he refusal to hire an individual based on stereotyped characterizations of the 
sexes" will not merit a BFOQ exception.106 
Several noteworthy BFOQ cases address the forbiddance of stereotype 
BFOQ defenses. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., Southern Bell 
argued that its exclusion of women from positions requiring employees to lift 
 
 104. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 n.21 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 105. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (5th Cir. 1969). 
 106. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1)(ii) (2008). 
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more than thirty pounds was protected under the BFOQ defense.107 There, the 
court explained that an employer must demonstrate that he has a "reasonable 
cause to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all 
women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the job 
involved."108 In rejecting Southern Bell's BFOQ claim, the court stated: 
Southern Bell has clearly not met that burden here. They introduced no evidence 
concerning the lifting abilities of women. Rather, they would have us "assume," 
on the basis of a "stereotyped characterization" that few or no women can safely 
lift 30 pounds, while all men are treated as if they can. . . . What does seem clear 
is that using these class stereotypes denies desirable positions to a great many 
women perfectly capable of performing the duties involved.109 
Thus, an employer's BFOQ claims must be premised on facts, not 
commonly held gender stereotypes. In Diaz v. Pan American World Airways, Pan 
American was charged with sex discrimination for its employment policy of 
hiring only women as in-flight cabin attendants.110 Pan-American's BFOQ 
argument for its gender-based hiring was twofold, citing both customer 
preference and the stereotyped belief that women were innately better "in the 
sense that they were superior in such non-mechanical aspects of the job as 
'providing reassurance to anxious passengers, giving courteous personalized 
service and, in general, making flights as pleasurable as possible. . . .'"111 Though 
the court "recognize[d] that the public's expectation of finding one sex in a 
particular role may cause some initial difficulty," such stereotyped views of 
gender roles were not found to be a valid basis for the BFOQ defense.112 
Accordingly, courts hold that employers may not evoke the BFOQ defense when 
it is premised on stereotyped thinking. 
2. Customer Preference 
Courts also normally reject BFOQ defenses based solely on customer 
preference, explaining that "it would be totally anomalous if we were to allow 
the preferences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex 
discrimination was valid. Indeed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices 
the Act was meant to overcome."113 Although customers often prefer that 
employers hire employees of one gender over the other, these preferences alone 
are typically insufficient to establish a BFOQ.114 The EEOC guidelines echo this 
sentiment, stating that "the refusal to hire an individual because of the 
preferences of coworkers, the employer, clients or customers" will not merit a 
BFOQ exception.115 In one of the most well known BFOQ cases, Southwest 
 
 107. 408 F.2d at 235–36. 
 108. Id. at 235. 
 109. Id. at 236. 
 110. 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971). 
 111. Id. at 387. 
 112. Id. at 389. 
 113. Id. at 389. 
 114. Id. But see infra Section III. 
 115. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) (2008). 
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Airlines was charged with gender discriminatory hiring practices for hiring only 
females for flight attendant and ticketing agent positions.116 Southwest argued 
that it should be permitted to "discriminate against males because its attractive 
female flight attendants and ticket agents personif[ied] the airline's sexy image 
and fulfill[ed] its public promise to take passengers skyward with 'love.'"117 
Southwest offered further proof that the company's success was highly 
dependent upon its marketing strategy of selling "love" through the services of 
its attractive female employees.118 While the court acknowledged that 
Southwest's marketing strategy of providing customers with "eye candy" might 
be preferred by passengers, it found the BFOQ defense invalid because selling 
love or sex appeal was not Southwest's primary business.119 Southwest's defense 
was further rejected because a man could perform the requisite job duties of a 
flight attendant or ticket agent.120 Accordingly, the Court explained, "sex does 
not become a BFOQ merely because an employer chooses to exploit female 
sexuality as a marketing tool or to better ensure profitability."121 
This prohibition against BFOQ defenses based upon customer preference is 
well established. Consequently, it is rare for employers to argue BFOQs based 
upon customer preference without blanketing their motivations with another 
purpose. Nevertheless, in Part III, this note addresses the fact that courts do not 
always apply this rule consistently, since some courts have permitted BFOQ 
defenses based on customer preference. 
3. The Selling of Sex Appeal in Businesses that Do Not Primarily Sell Sex 
Another common motive for discriminatory hiring occurs when employers 
wish to hire employees on account of their sex appeal. Employers often realize 
that staffing their businesses with sexy employees attracts additional customers 
and increases business. This tactic is more often aimed at male customers 
through the hiring of attractive female employees. However, even if a company 
uses sex to market services or products, that alone is not enough to permit a 
BFOQ defense. This motive was certainly at play when the court rejected 
Southwest Airlines' BFOQ defense. Southwest hired female employees in an 
effort to increase sales through the promotion of its "love" image.122 There, 
Southwest's image and advertising were permeated by sex.123 Their television 
commercials focused on attractive female flight attendants assisting male 
passengers with a voice-over guaranteeing "in-flight love."124 The airline served 
"love bites" (almonds) and "love-potions" (cocktails) and used a "quickie 
 
 116. Wilson v. Southwest Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 117. Id. at 293. 
 118. Id. at 295. 
 119. Id. at 302. 
 120. Id. (stating, "[T]he ability of the airline to perform its primary business function, the 
transportation of passengers, would not be jeopardized by hiring males."). 
 121. Id. at 303. 
 122. See generally id. 
 123. Id. at 294 n.4. (stating that "Unabashed allusions to love and sex pervade all aspects of 
Southwest's public image."). 
 124. Id. 
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machine" (ticketing machine) to provide "instant gratification" (quick service).125 
Even though Southwest utilized sex as its primary method of advertising, and a 
significant portion of their success resulted from the sex appeal of the 
employees, this still was not enough to allow a BFOQ because Southwest was 
not in the business of selling sex.126 
Though businesses that do not primarily sell sex are prohibited from 
making sexually discriminatory hiring decisions, businesses whose "essence" is 
the actual selling of sex are permitted to hire based upon gender. According to 
the court in Wilson v. Southwest Airline Co., a BFOQ defense based upon sex 
appeal is permitted where "vicarious sex entertainment is the primary service 
provided" and "female sexuality [is] reasonably necessary to perform the 
dominate purpose of the job which is forthrightly to titillate and entice male 
customers."127 Thus, a strip club that hires only women to perform as exotic 
dancers or a gentleman's club employing only females as topless waitresses can 
still shield discrimination suits by employing the BFOQ defense. Considering 
that the defense is quite attainable when a business's main service is the selling 
of sexual entertainment, opponents of the BFOQ often focus upon its frequent 
use in sexually denigrating situations, especially highlighting the resulting 
subordination of women.128 
The determination of whether sexual entertainment is the primary product 
or service of a business is challenging, however, because many businesses teeter 
on this edge, offering services that are laced with sex appeal. An often cited 
example of this practice is Hooters' policy of hiring only female waitresses.129 
Hooters is a favored eating establishment for male clientele precisely because of 
its scantily clad female servers. Hooters unquestionably draws larger crowds, 
earns higher profits, and achieves increased popularity as a result of the sexual 
promotion of its waitresses.130 While the female servers may be preferred by the 
majority of customers and thus increase business, Hooters primary business is 
the serving of food and beverages to customers, not the serving of sex appeal. 
Although there has never been a court decision on the merits of Hooters' hiring 
practices, the company was sued in 1994 for its gender discriminatory hiring.131 
Hooters raised the BFOQ exception as a defense, but eventually entered into a 
3.75 million dollar settlement that permitted the company to continue excluding 
 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 302. 
 127. Id. at 301. 
 128. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race and Equal Protection,  61 
N.Y.U.L. REV. 1003, 1027(1986) ("The statutory model of equal protection is riddled with exceptions 
that perpetuate women's subordination, the most egregious of which is that sex-specific employment 
discrimination claims under Title VII can be defended with arguments of "bona fide occupational 
qualification."). 
 129. See, e.g., Kimberly A. Yuracko, Private Nurses and Playboy Bunnies: Explaining Permissible Sex 
Discrimination, 92 CAL. L. REV. 147, 204 (2004); Rachel L. Cantor, Comment: Consumer Preference for Sex 
and Title VII: Employing Market Definition Analysis for Evaluating BFOQ Defenses, 1999 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 
493, 493–94 (1999). 
 130. See About Hooters, http://www.hooters.com/About.aspx (last visited Nov. 20, 2008) ("The 
'nearly world famous' Hooters Girls are the cornerstone of the Hooters concept."). 
 131. Latuga v. Hooters, Inc., No. 93 C 7709, 1994 WL 113079 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 1, 1994) (dismissed on 
procedural grounds). 
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men from its server positions, but mandated the creation of gender neutral 
positions for bartenders and hosts.132 If taken to court, it is unlikely that Hooters 
could successfully defend its hiring practices based upon the BFOQ, considering 
that its primary business is not the selling of sexual entertainment. 
IV.  INCONSISTENCIES WITHIN BFOQ CASE LAW 
Although some believe the BFOQ's regulations are straight forward, in 
application, the BFOQ is riddled with inconsistencies. Unsurprisingly, courts 
have allowed their own values and beliefs to infiltrate their decisions. This is 
problematic, given that some courts' rulings are jurisprudentially inconsistent 
and some cases directly contradict each other. Most inconsistencies can be found 
within the privacy BFOQ exception, likely because popularly held privacy 
beliefs often conflict with Title VII's forbiddance of gender-based hiring. 
Although it is not unordinary to see such variations within an area so heavily 
influenced by personal beliefs and stereotypes, for some, these discrepancies 
undermine the value of the statute. Accordingly, some scholars argue that these 
inconsistencies demonstrate a serious application problem, and use this to 
bolster their arguments that the BFOQ exception should be completely 
eliminated or significantly reduced.133 For others, however, these inconsistencies 
actually illustrate the need for the BFOQ defense, as many of the cases below 
illustrate a strong need for gender-based hiring.134 Finally, some maintain that 
these inconsistencies prove the need for an expansion of the BFOQ defense, 
especially since many of the discrepancies found in the cases below result from 
courts' attempts to circumvent the statute due to their strongly held beliefs that 
gender-based hiring is imperative, at least within the privacy field.135 Those 
arguing for an expansion of the defense explain that the statute should be 
modified to represent the needs of employers and consumers and the practices 
that courts actually permit.136 Thus, it is important to recognize the discrepancies 
present in the case law. 
A. Privacy BFOQ Contradictions 
Although courts regularly uphold BFOQ defenses based upon privacy, 
some scholars argue that privacy motives are little more than customer 
 
 132. See Joshua Burstein, Testing the Strength of Title VII Sexual Harassment: Can It Support A 
Hostile Work Environment Claim Brought By A Nude Dancer?, 24 N.Y.U. REV L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 293 
n.122 (1998). 
 133. See generally Amy Kapczynski, Note, Same-Sex Privacy and the Limits of Antidiscrimination 
Law, 112 YALE L.J. 1257 (2003); Jillian B. Berman, Comment, Defining the "Essence of the Business": An 
Analysis of Title VII's Privacy BFOQ after Johnson Controls, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 749 (1999); Deborah A. 
Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical Framework for Reconciling 
Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1985); Elsa M. Shartsis, Comment, Privacy as Rationale for 
the Sex-Based BFOQ, 1985 DET. C.L. REV. 865 (1985). 
 134. Ashlie E. Case, Comment, Conflicting Feminisms and the Rights of Women Prisoners, 17 YALE 
J.L. & FEMINISM 309 (2005). 
 135. Emily Gold Waldman, The Case of the Male OB-GYN: A Proposal for Expansion of the Privacy 
BFOQ in the Healthcare Context, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 357 (2004). 
 136. Id. at 391. 
MANLEY__FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:43:47 PM 
 THE BFOQ DEFENSE 187 
preference and stereotype motives in disguise.137 In reality, almost anytime that 
an employer is arguing for the privacy of its clientele, the concern is based upon 
the privacy preferences of its customers.138 Moreover, these privacy preferences 
are often founded upon stereotyped assumptions of the sexes. This is 
problematic, however, given that customer preferences and stereotypes have 
been expressly denied as valid BFOQ motives. 
1. Privacy BFOQ Cases are Inconsistent with Non-Privacy BFOQ Cases 
The confusion over the privacy BFOQ begins with the initial problem that 
court decisions allowing privacy BFOQs do not seem to square with non-privacy 
BFOQ cases. Courts have been explicitly clear that customer preference and 
stereotype motives do not permit BFOQ defenses.139 Most notable are the widely 
cited airline cases, previously discussed, where airlines' attempts to hire women 
based upon customer preferences were rejected, even after providing proof that 
gender-based hiring contributed to the success of their businesses.140 In Diaz v. 
Pan-American World Airways, Inc., for example, the airline introduced evidence of 
a survey finding that "79% of the passengers surveyed, male and female, 
prefer[ed] being served by a female stewardess to a male steward," along with 
expert psychological evidence explaining passengers' preference for female 
flight attendants.141 Although the Fifth Circuit agreed that customers might 
prefer female flight attendants, Pan-American's defense was nevertheless 
rejected.142 Some courts have come down even stronger against these motives. 
For example, in Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co., the employer failed to promote a 
female employee to the position of vice-president of Internal Operations because 
the position required interaction with Latin American clients, who would 
respond negatively to a woman in the position.143 Although the case was 
decided upon other grounds, the court stated, in dicta, that sex was not a BFOQ 
for the position.144 In deciding this, the court wholly disagreed with the lower 
court's finding that a BFOQ is permitted if "no customer will do business with a 
member of one sex either because it would destroy the essence of the business or 
would create serious . . . efficacy problems."145 The court instead found that even 
in this situation, customer preferences based on sexual stereotypes could not 
justify discrimination."146 In light of these cases and many other non-privacy 
BFOQ cases, it is clearly established that customer preferences and stereotypes 
do not permit a BFOQ. 
 
 137. See, e.g., Yuracko, supra note 129; Cantor, supra note 129, at 502–03. 
 138. See Cantor, supra note 129, at 502–03. 
 139. See supra Part II(B). 
 140. See Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385 (5th Cir. 1971); Wilson v. Southwest 
Airlines, 517 F. Supp. 292 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 141. 311 F. Supp. 559, 565–66 (S.D. Fla. 1970). 
 142. Diaz, 442 F.2d at 389. 
 143. 653 F.2d 1273, 1274–75 (9th Cir. 1981). 
 144. Id. at 1276–77. 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 1277. 
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2. Courts Deciding Privacy BFOQ Cases Require Conflicting Levels and Types 
 of Proof 
When courts have upheld privacy-based BFOQs, they have been 
inconsistent in their requirements of both the type and the level of proof 
necessary to establish the defense. While several courts have allowed customer 
preference and stereotype motives in privacy cases, others have not. Some 
courts have permitted a privacy BFOQ when an employer has shown that clients 
would not consent to services provided by a member of the opposite sex, but 
other courts have required employers to show that customers would stop 
utilizing their services altogether. Alternatively, other courts have found that 
even in privacy situations, no amount of proof will overcome the prohibition 
against customer preference and stereotype BFOQs. What's more, although 
some courts have required employers to present statistical evidence of their 
customers' demands, other courts have not. Such discrepancies are disconcerting 
both for employers hoping to utilize the defense and for those questioning its 
validity. 
A comparison of cases illustrates the inconsistencies described above. In 
Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, a court permitted a BFOQ for the position of 
obstetrical nurse partly based upon the evidence of a doctor testifying that one 
half of her patients and more than one half of her clients' husbands would object 
to treatment by a male nurse.147 Similarly, in Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, 
Inc., the court found a nursing home's sex-based hiring of women permissible 
since many of the female patients would not consent to male workers providing 
intimate-contact services, and some stated they would leave the home if male 
nurses or aides were hired.148 Although not all of the female residents were 
polled, the court found the Assistant Superintendent's testimony sufficient that 
"it was her belief that the female guests would not accept personal care from 
male nurse's aides."149 Clearly, customer preference was accepted as a legitimate 
motive for the gender-based hiring in both cases. Nevertheless, Griffin v. 
Michigan Department of Corrections illustrates a striking contrast.150 In Griffin, the 
court quickly rejected a prison's gender-based hiring policy prohibiting women 
from working within residential units.151 The court found that the policy was 
illegally "based on a stereotypical sexual characterization that a viewing of an 
inmate while nude or performing bodily functions, by a member of the opposite 
sex, is intrinsically more odious than the viewing by a member of one's own 
sex,"152 and this was "just the type of stereotypical value system condemned by 
Title VII."153 Although the privacy rights of prisoners are less than those of the 
general public, the statements of the court directly contradict Backus and Fesel. In 
both Backus and Fesel the courts did expressly what the Griffin court forbid; they 
each accepted the stereotypical sexual characterization that a nurse of the 
 
 147. 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1196 (E.D. Ark. 1981). 
 148. 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352–54 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 149. Id. at 1352. 
 150. 654 F. Supp. 690 (E.D. Mich. 1982). 
 151. Id. at 705. 
 152. Id. at 701. 
 153. Id. at 702. 
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opposite sex viewing a nude patient was intrinsically more odious than the 
viewing by a member of one's own sex.154 Adding further inconsistency, in 
Slivka v. Camden-Clark Memorial Hospital, the West Virginia State Supreme Court 
ruled against a hospital attempting to utilize a privacy-based BFOQ.155 In that 
case, the hospital had a policy of hiring only female obstetrics nurses.156 In 
defense of its policy the hospital provided evidence that "80 [percent] of patients 
objected to having a male nurse[,]" and male physicians requested female nurses 
as chaperones in their rounds.157 Even with this evidence, the court struck down 
the policy citing a lack of information.158 While the hospital's BFOQ defense was 
not found sufficient, the court explained that there could be situations in which 
privacy interests would trump those of equal opportunity employment.159 The 
inconsistent holdings of Backus, Fesel, Griffin, and Slivka make privacy-based 
BFOQ requirements even more unclear. 
Courts are also inconsistent in the type of proof necessary to uphold a 
BFOQ defense, with some requiring direct statistical proof of the BFOQ 
necessity, and others completely ignoring this requirement. Non-privacy cases 
have required that employers have "a factual basis for believing, that all or 
substantially all [men or women] would be unable to perform safely and 
efficiently the duties of the job involved."160 However, in Fesel, the court found 
that the Assistant Superintendent's personal belief that women patients would 
not consent to cross-sex care was sufficient.161 Similarly, in Torres v. Wisconsin 
Department of Health & Social Services, the court granted a BFOQ defense based 
on rehabilitation without any showing of empirical evidence, finding that the 
"professional judgment" of the superintendent was of higher importance.162 
Evidently, the same proof that some courts accept as sufficient to permit a 
BFOQs, others reject as insufficient. 
Although courts are unquestionably inconsistent in their application of the 
privacy BFOQ, the extent of the privacy breach seems to weigh heavily in their 
decisions. When privacy breaches are minimal, courts are much less likely to 
grant BFOQ defenses. For example, in EEOC v. HI 40 Corp., an employer 
maintained a policy of hiring only females for weight loss counselor positions.163 
HI 40 Corporation argued that some customers believed having their body 
 
 154. See generally Backus v. Baptist Medical Center, 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark 1981); Fesel v. 
Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 155. Slivka v. Camden-Clark Mem'l Hosp., 594 S.E.2d 616 (W. Va. 2004). 
 156. Id. at 617–18. 
 157. Id. at 623. 
 158. Id. at 623–24. 
 159. Id. at 624 (stating that "[D]iscrimination may be valid in instances when privacy interests 
trump the principle of equal employment opportunity. And while accommodation or balancing of 
both issues is the goal, it is not always practicable."). 
 160. Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 235 (5th Cir. 1969). See also Int'l Union v. 
Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 203 (1991). 
 161. 447 F. Supp. 1346, 1352 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 162. 859 F.2d 1523, 1530–32 (7th Cir. 1988) (finding it an unfair and unrealistic burden to require 
the defendants to produce objective evidence, from empirical studies or otherwise). 
 163. 953 F. Supp. 301, 302 (W.D. Mo. 1996). 
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measurements taken by men would be a privacy intrusion.164 There, the court 
stated that "[a] minimal intrusion on the privacy of customers must be tolerated 
if the elimination of that intrusion 'tramples' the employment opportunities" of 
men.165 Whatever the reason, the discrepancy in the aforementioned privacy 
cases is apparent both when they are compared to non-privacy BFOQ cases and 
when they are compared to other privacy cases. 
Furthermore, many privacy concerns are the result of gender stereotypes, 
which have been expressly denied as BFOQ motives.166 This problem is 
exemplified in the common double standard treatment of male and female 
employees in privacy BFOQ cases. In most of the privacy BFOQ cases, 
employers maintain policies preventing men from cross-viewing positions, but 
not all prevent women from corresponding cross-viewing positions.167 Society 
seems to be much more accepting of women providing intimate care for men, 
than it is of men providing intimate care for women, and this acceptance is 
noticeable in courts decisions. Accordingly, health care employers are more 
likely to ban male care providers from the intimate care of female patients than 
to ban females from the intimate care of male patients. Part of this difference can 
likely be accounted for by the stereotypical belief that women are better suited 
for caretaking and nursing positions. This difference could also be attributed to 
the societal conception that men, unlike women, cannot stifle their sexual 
thoughts from surfacing while at work. Men are often stereotyped as sexually 
motivated, having "one-track minds" that cannot stop them from ogling the 
naked female body. Whatever the reason, these stereotypes result in a 
discriminatory double standard in hiring and staffing procedures. Serious 
concerns arise when privacy BFOQs are actually premised upon stereotypes, 
however, since this contradicts the express rejection of stereotypes as valid 
BFOQ motives. 
3. Privacy BFOQ Cases Do Not Meet the Essence of the Business Test 
Even if we find that privacy concerns are based upon something other than 
customer preferences or stereotypes, opponents further argue that privacy-
based BFOQs do not pass the main hurdle of a valid BFOQ defense- the "essence 
of the business" test. Under the test, employers must show that employees of 
one gender cannot successfully perform the job duties essential to fulfill the 
employer's primary business function.168 However, in most privacy cases, an 
employer's business would not be undermined without gender-based hiring. 
For example, the essence of a hospital's business is to provide medical services 
for patients, the essence of a nursing home is to provide care for its patients, and 
the essence of a janitorial business is to provide cleaning services. In each of 
these examples, the fulfillment of the essence of the business could be achieved 
without gender-based hiring. Though some may argue that a hospital or nursing 
 
 164. Id. at 303–304. 
 165. Id. at 304 (emphasis added). 
 166. See, e.g., Wilson v. Southwest Airlines Co., 517 F. Supp. 292, 301 n.21 (N.D. Tex. 1981). 
 167. See, e.g., Hi 40 Corp., 953 F. Supp. at 302–303; Fesel v. Masonic Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. 
Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). 
 168. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991). 
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home's primary business is to provide services with the promise of privacy, this 
broader reading of the essence of the business test seems forbidden by Johnson 
Controls. There, the Supreme Court rejected the defendant's BFOQ argument 
that the essence of its business was to make batteries in an industrially safe 
manner, without harming unborn children.169 Instead, the Court found that the 
essence of a business was to be interpreted narrowly, meaning that Johnson 
Controls' essence was solely that of manufacturing batteries.170 In reaching this 
decision, the Court explained: 
[T]he safety exception is limited to instances in which sex . . . actually interferes 
with the employee's ability to perform the job. This approach is consistent with 
the language of the BFOQ provision itself, for it suggests that permissible 
distinctions based on sex must relate to ability to perform the duties of the 
job.171 
If privacy BFOQ defenses have synonymous requirements, employers 
should be required to show that sex actually interferes with the employee's 
ability to perform the job. Since privacy BFOQs are not based upon the 
employees' abilities, but instead are needed to fulfill third party desires, it is 
unclear whether this is, in fact, a valid BFOQ under the Supreme Court's 
precedent. For this reason, the privacy defense is difficult to reconcile with the 
Supreme Court's narrow reading of the essence of business analysis. 
4. Many Privacy Concerns Could be Resolved by Rearranging Work Assignments 
Finally, if privacy defenses do meet the essence of the business test, there is 
yet another discrepancy between privacy and non-privacy BFOQ cases. 
Normally, courts require employers to show that no reasonable alternative to 
gender-based hiring exists.172 However, many privacy requests could be fulfilled 
by rearranging the work assignments of current employees. When an employer 
need only rearrange the duties of existing staff to alleviate customer privacy 
concerns, a privacy BFOQ defense directly contradicts the requirement that no 
reasonable alternative to the discriminatory hiring exists. 
Even if employers were required to equally hire both women and men, 
most could arrange tasks to allow for the privacy of patients. However, current 
BFOQ jurisprudence only requires that no reasonable alternative exist.173 
Nevertheless, it is still unclear what alternatives courts will find reasonable. 
Although gender-neutral hiring prevents discrimination, for some employers it 
is both wasteful and expensive. For example, a hospital or nursing home could 
be required to equally hire and staff male and female nurses. In situations where 
a male nurse could not fulfill all of the caretaking duties, a female nurse could 
be on hand to assist. Although this would require some employers to staff an 
additional employee, it is a potential resolution to the privacy concerns of 
 
 169. Id. at 204–206. 
 170. Id. 
 171. Id. at 204. 
 172. See, e.g., Norwood v. Dale Maint. Sys., Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1410, 1415–16 (N.D. Ill. 1984); 
Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1374 (11th Cir. 1982). 
 173. Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1415–16. 
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employers and their customers. Although many employers would consider this 
requirement quite burdensome, it is possible that courts would deem it 
reasonable based on the high value of equal opportunity employment. 
Alternatively, employers could transfer discrimination costs directly to 
patients. For example, in Wilson v. Sibley Memorial Hospital, the Professional 
Nurses Registry maintained a system where private nurses were hired without 
regard for sex.174 Even if a patient requested a nurse of a specific gender, the first 
available nurse was sent. If, on arrival, the patient was not satisfied, the nurse 
could be rejected, but the patient was required to pay for the nurse's full day of 
services.175 Programs such as this shift the costs of discrimination to patients or 
customers, instead of placing them on employees. This type of system would 
allow men and women equal opportunities in hiring, but could still sometimes 
result in unequal work experience. Nevertheless, strategies that transfer the 
costs to patients are a controversial solution, given that not all patients with 
privacy concerns can afford to finance such requests. Accordingly, it is again 
unclear whether courts would consider this a reasonable requirement. 
Regardless of whether additional staffing requirements or cost shifting are 
reasonable tactics, the simple rearranging of work assignments could have 
reasonably resolved privacy concerns in some of the cases where courts 
permitted a privacy BFOQ. Given that most courts, at least outside of the 
privacy area, require employers to show that there is no reasonable alternative 
to a sex-based policy,176 this illustrates yet another inconsistency with privacy-
based BFOQs. 
B. Safety BFOQ Contradictions 
Contradictions also surface within the area of safety BFOQs. Although 
courts rarely uphold BFOQs based upon safety, the Supreme Court's decision in 
Dothard v. Rawlinson is an exception.177 Safety BFOQ cases are often founded on 
views of women's physical ability or vulnerability, and Dothard is no different. 
There, the Supreme Court justified its decision to permit a safety BFOQ based 
upon the "peculiarly inhospitable" environment of the prison.178 As a result of 
the "rampant violence," "jungle atmosphere," and non-segregation of sex 
offenders, the court found that a woman's ability to maintain order could be 
reduced by her very womanhood.179 The Court concluded that women guards 
would be more vulnerable to attack and harassment, particularly because 
inmates were deprived of a "normal heterosexual environment [and] would 
assault women because they were women."180 However, the record presented no 
evidence that women guards created a greater danger to the prison's security 
and nothing to support the risk that "inmates would assault a woman because 
 
 174. 340 F. Supp. 686, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
 175. Id. 
 176. See, e.g., Norwood, 590 F. Supp. at 1415–16; Hardin, 691 F.2d at 1374. 
 177. 433 U.S. 321, 334 (1977) (finding that being male was a BFOQ for the position of correctional 
officer). 
 178. Id. at 334. 
 179. Id. at 334–35. 
 180. Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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she was a woman."181 Furthermore, these beliefs ignore the fact that while 
women, as a class, may be weaker than men, many individual women possess 
greater strength than their male counterparts. Rejecting the entire class of 
females, but permitting the entire class of males, based upon notions of relative 
strength, is an inexact and inaccurate method of selection. Moreover, though 
sexual assault against female guards may be more common, this does not take 
away from the fact that male guards are also attacked, a concern the court 
seemed to ignore. Without proof of the higher likelihood of female attack, it is 
unlikely that the Court reached its conclusion without the assistance of some 
gender stereotypes. In fact, this concern was highlighted in Justice Marshall's 
dissent: 
 
In short, the fundamental justification for the decision is that women as guards 
will generate sexual assaults. With all respect, this rationale regrettably 
perpetuates one of the most insidious of the old myths about women—that 
women, wittingly or not, are seductive sexual objects. The effect of the decision, 
made I am sure with the best of intentions, is to punish women because their 
very presence might provoke sexual assaults. It is women who are made to pay 
the price in lost job opportunities for the threat of depraved conduct by prison 
inmates. Once again, "[t]he pedestal upon which women have been placed 
has . . . , upon closer inspection, been revealed as a cage."182 
C. Resolving the Inconsistencies 
How do we reconcile the fact that courts have expressly forbid motives of 
customer preference and stereotypes, but still allow the privacy BFOQ? First, it 
is important to consider whether privacy motives are somehow distinctive from 
other customer preference justifications. Although a privacy BFOQ is, at the 
core, one of customer preference, courts faced with privacy matters often 
consider them different and more valid than all other customer preference 
matters. So much so, that most courts gloss over the fact that privacy 
motivations are based on customer preference. Though some courts meet this 
discrepancy head on and find that privacy interests are a distinct issue, others 
completely ignore the inconsistency. This is, maybe in part, because privacy 
concerns are often not based upon a customer's mere preference, but are so deeply 
imperative that they are actually customer requirements. An unfulfilled privacy 
customer preference or requirement may inflict a dignitary harm on an 
individual, resulting in physical, emotional, or psychological damage.183 This 
effect makes privacy preferences dissimilar from other customer preferences. 
Whereas the patron of a restaurant might feel slightly less comfortable with a 
male server, a patient requiring assistance with his or her intimate care may 
actually suffer serious distress from cross-sex viewing or touching. This 
increased gravity has been recognized by both scholars and courts. A leading 
 
 181. Id. (citation omitted). 
 182. Id. 
 183. See, e.g., Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1534 (9th Cir. 1993) (Reinhardt J., concurring) 
(describing the emotional harm and physical illness an inmate experienced after an intrusive cross-
sex body search). 
MANLEY__FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:43:47 PM 
194 DUKE JOURNAL OF GENDER LAW & POLICY Volume 16:169 2009 
treatise explains, "Giving respect to deep-seated feelings of personal privacy 
involving one's own genital areas is quite a different matter from catering to the 
desire of some male airline passengers to have a little diluted sexual titillation 
from the hovering presence of an attractive female flight attendant."184 Similarly, 
in the case of Jordan v. Gardner, Judge Reinhardt's concurring opinion described 
an inmate's physical aversion to cross-sex touching: "After an inmate was 
searched by a male guard, her fingers had to be pried from the bars she had 
grabbed; she returned to her cellblock, vomited, and broke down."185 Due to the 
increased severity of consequences, privacy customer preferences may be 
distinct from other customer preference motives. 
Finally, privacy motives find express validation in the courts:186 "We cannot 
conceive of a more basic subject of privacy than the naked body. The desire to 
shield one's unclothed figured [sic] from view of strangers, and particularly 
strangers of the opposite sex, is impelled by elementary self-respect and 
personal dignity."187 The Backus court, for example, found that constitutional 
privacy rights were at stake, explaining, "Defendant contends that if a male 
nurse is performing these duties, the patient's constitutional right to privacy is 
violated. We agree with the defendant."188 Although the Constitution does not 
expressly provide a right to privacy, this right has been extracted from the First, 
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.189 However, these rights are 
not unlimited, and the government's legitimate practices may sometimes 
overpower individual privacy rights.190 
Even though some courts validate BFOQs under a right to privacy theory, 
others argue that no constitutional privacy right exists in the BFOQ 
circumstance. Given that patients and customers are fully able to reject care from 
members of the opposite sex, they argue that any constitutional right to privacy 
is circumvented by their assent.191 Author Amy Kapczynski has taken a strong 
stance against the existence of such a right, explaining: 
The claim made in Backus that constitutional privacy rights are at stake in same-
sex privacy BFOQ cases is similarly flawed. The court does not make clear 
where this right would come from or what its exact nature would be, but 
consider the possible alternatives. If the court is imagining some sort of 
 
 184. EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, 3–43 Employment Discrimination § 43.02(3)(b) 
(Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., 2008). See also Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 
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 186. See, e.g., Hardin v. Stynchcomb, 691 F.2d 1364, 1373 (11th Cir. 1982); Backus v. Baptist Med. 
Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191, 1193 (E.D. Ark. 1981), vacated as moot, 671 F.2d 1100 (8th Cir. 1982); Forts v. 
Ward, 471 F. Supp. 1095, 1098 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), vacated in part on other grounds, 621 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir. 
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 187. York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963). 
 188. 510 F. Supp. at 1193. 
 189. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 190. See Deborah A. Calloway, Equal Employment and Third Party Privacy Interests: An Analytical 
Framework for Reconciling Competing Rights, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 335 (1985). 
 191. See Kapczynski, supra note 133, at 1268 ("[E]very legal right that patients have to privacy is 
rendered irrelevant by the fact that patients must consent to medical procedures."). 
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penumbral right to same-sex privacy itself, rather than a choice of same-sex 
privacy, from where does it derive the parameters of this right? If Title VII 
violates this right when it requires hospitals to employ male nurses in labor and 
delivery rooms, why does it not also violate it in all of the other wards of a 
hospital or nursing home where patients receive intimate care? Furthermore, a 
constitutional right to same-sex privacy would imply that such a right must be 
protected by any healthcare provider that could be considered a state actor for 
these purposes—but no one claims that a patient not granted a same-sex nurse 
has a constitutional cause of action against the provider.192 
Kapczynski is not alone in this opinion; several scholars agree that no 
constitutional right to privacy exists in these BFOQ cases, creating yet another 
incongruity in the case law.193 The Supreme Court has not provided any clarity 
on the matter, leaving lower courts to address privacy BFOQ cases 
inconsistently because of the lack of a single authoritative approach. 
D. Other Viewpoints on the Causes of Inconsistency 
The reasons for the aforementioned inconsistencies have been discussed by 
other scholars as well. Robert Post has written extensively on the variation of 
decisions produced under Title VII claims. Post finds that the "courts' rhetoric of 
gender blindness does not explain their actual decisions in Title VII cases."194 
Instead, he finds inconsistencies can be attributed to the fact that "Title VII does 
not simply displace gender practices, but rather interacts with them in a 
selective manner."195 He maintains that antidiscrimination law does not "liberate 
individuals from the thrall of social 'stereotypes,'" but instead intervenes "only 
to reshape the nature and content of social stereotypes."196 This is in part due to 
his belief that antidiscrimination law itself is a social practice and that the law 
regulates social practices once they become controversial.197 Similarly, authors 
Mayer G. Freed and Daniel P. Polsby have found the BFOQ defense to be replete 
with inconsistencies, explaining that nearly every requirement is subject to 
"substantial qualification."198 They explain that BFOQ cases are often decided by 
the use of "discretionary line drawing in which the courts are required to 
exercise a judgment about the interaction of equality values and other social 
norms."199 This discretionary line drawing results in inconsistent decisions due 
 
 192. Id. at 1270 (footnote and information in parenthesis omitted). 
 193. See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 191, at 340–42 (stating that a constitutional right to privacy 
"should be re-examined because statutorily mandated equal employment may not burden patient 
privacy enough to establish a constitutional violation"). 
 194. Yuracko, supra note 129, at 150 (citing ROBERT C. POST ET AL., PREJUDICIAL APPEARANCES: 
THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW 1–53 (2001)). 
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to the varying social values and norms.200 Therefore, they suggest a different 
Title VII formulation to more adequately explain the current state of Title VII.201 
Such a formulation would "recognize that although explicit sex classifications 
are presumptively invalid, they can be justified where there are strong efficiency 
interests at stake or where there is a broadly shared social norm that requires 
that men and women be treated differently."202 Finally, Kimberly A. Yuracko 
finds that "there is no plausible conception of business 'essence'" that can explain 
the inconsistency in cases that allows customer preference to create a BFOQ in 
some situations, but not in others.203 Yuracko similarly argues that social values 
and preferences shape the decisions.204 If these scholars' opinions are correct, we 
must question whether we are comfortable with courts crafting decisions that 
interact with and accept currently held stereotypes and norms, instead of 
eradicating them. 
V.  TITLE VII DOES NOT PROVIDE A BFOQ FOR RACE 
An additional problem with the current application of the BFOQ defense is 
its apparent unequal treatment of race and gender discrimination. Although 
Title VII permits gender discrimination if motivated by a valid BFOQ defense, it 
does not allow the same exception for a BFOQ based upon race or color.205 In 
other words, Title VII maintains that discrimination based upon race is never 
tolerable, but discrimination based upon gender is sometimes acceptable. This 
incongruity seems to suggest the framers believed that there was something 
inherently different between race and gender discrimination, or more simply, 
that gender discrimination was not always a problem. Because the lack of a race 
exception causes some BFOQ opponents to insist that a gender BFOQ is equally 
uncalled for, the reasons for this dissimilarity are important to consider. 
The lack of a race BFOQ exception is notable because, in reality, race-based 
hiring occurs, even though Title VII does not provide an exception for it. Black 
actors are cast to portray black characters, white undercover agents are hired to 
infiltrate certain race-based hate groups (such as the Ku Klux Klan), and, when 
necessary, police officers are assigned neighborhood patrols based upon race. 
While Title VII forbids race-based hiring by excluding it as valid BFOQ 
classification, there is no doubt that positions exist where people are staffed 
based upon their race. One scholar has noted, "we ought to admit the possibility 
of a BFOQ in the case of race, as federal law does not, because there seems 
nothing harmful, in a realist production, in requiring that we have actors who 
look—and sound—like people of whatever racial identity they are 
representing."206 Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit has recognized race as a 
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BFOQ within the confines of an equal protection case.207 Taking the above 
information into consideration, it seems peculiar that a BFOQ based upon race 
does not exist. 
The absence of a race-based BFOQ has been recognized by courts and 
scholars alike. Several courts have stated that Congress intentionally excluded 
race and color as BFOQ defenses.208 Furthermore, the legislative history of Title 
VII shows that Congress considered, but rejected a race-based BFOQ,209 where 
the House of Representatives discussed and denied an amendment to the BFOQ 
portion of the statute to include race and color.210 Congress' decision to exclude 
race and color as permissible discriminatory classifications was due to the fact 
that they found race discrimination to be more prevalent and harmful than other 
forms of discrimination: "Title VII is a blanket prohibition of racial 
discrimination, rational and irrational alike, even more so than of other forms of 
discrimination attacked in Title VII."211 A Congressman who spoke in opposition 
to the House of Representatives' proposed amendment to the BFOQ provision to 
include race and color addressed this, explaining: 
The trouble with the amendment offered by the gentleman from Mississippi is 
that it opens up a good deal more than the case of casting director looking for 
actors to play certain roles in dramatic production. If it was limited to that, it 
would be a lot more acceptable than it is. But it opens up other possibilities that 
I do not think any of us would want to open.212 
Undoubtedly, Congressman O'Hara was worried about the continued 
discrimination a race-based BFOQ would allow. However, some scholars 
believe that Congress may not have provided a race exception because the 
members found it unnecessary, believing that Title VII did not outlaw all forms 
of racial discrimination. For example, one member of the Senate asked whether 
the Harlem Globetrotters or movie directors could still discriminate based on 
race.213 The Senate was told that both groups would be exempt from Title VII's 
ban on discriminatory hiring; the Harlem Globetrotters did not have enough 
employees to be required to follow Title VII and movie directors could 
discriminate based on physical appearance instead of race.214 Members of the 
House of Representatives were under similar impressions. For example, 
Congressman O'Hara stated: "In the example used, which involved a dramatic 
performance, some particular role may require a person whose skin is of a 
particular hue. I do not think that when you seek such person for that role, you 
come within the meaning of the unfair practices described in this bill."215 
 
 207. Wittmer v. Peters, 87 F.3d 916 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 208. Rucker v. Higher Educ. Aids Bd., 669 F.2d 1179, 1181 (7th Cir. 1982); Swint v. Pullman-
Standard, 624 F.2d 525, 535 (5th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 273 (1982). 
 209. See 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (1964) (prepared statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case). 
 210. See 110 CONG. REC. 2550–63 (1964) (amendment offered by Rep. Williams). 
 211. Rucker, 669 F.2d at 1181. 
 212. Id. (statement of Rep. O'Hara). 
 213. 110 CONG. REC. 7217 (prepared statement of Sen. Clark & Sen. Case). 
 214. Id. 
 215. 110 CONG. REC. 2556 (statement of Rep. O'Hara). 
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Although other reasons may have been in play, the chief reason Congress 
excluded a race-based BFOQ was the concern that any allowance of racial 
discrimination would damage Title VII's effectiveness in prohibiting 
discrimination. As Congressman Celler precisely explained in rejecting an 
amendment to add race as a BFOQ, "[T]he basic purpose of Title VII is to 
prohibit discrimination in employment on the basis of race or color. Now, the 
substitute amendment, I fear would destroy this principle. It would permit 
discrimination on the basis of race or color. It would establish a loophole that 
could well gut this title."216 Strangely, Congressmen did not voice concerns that 
the same setback would result from a gender-based BFOQ. But, why would a 
loophole for race gut the statute, while a loophole for gender would not? One 
likely explanation is that Congress fully realized a gender-based BFOQ would 
produce the same consequence, but found such a result inconsequential. This 
explanation is sensible, considering the diminished importance Congress placed 
upon gender discrimination, as opposed to racial discrimination. Realizing that 
this is a probable explanation, at least in part, one must consider whether the 
beliefs effecting the creation of the gender BFOQ exception allow the defense to 
remain appropriate today. 
Therefore, when considering whether the gender-based BFOQ defense 
should still be available, it is helpful to consider the reasons Congress excluded 
a race-based BFOQ: they believed such an allowance would destroy the 
principle of Title VII by permitting discrimination, and establish a loophole that 
could gut the statute. Bearing in mind the lesser value Congress placed upon 
eradicating gender discrimination,217 it is entirely possible that it fully realized a 
gender-based BFOQ would similarly permit discrimination, while providing a 
loophole for employers, but chose to disregard these consequences. If an attempt 
was made to defeat the statute by adding gender as a protected category, it is 
probable that many of the Congressmen voting for its passage did not consider 
gender discrimination problematic. In fact, if it was feasible that Congress 
would go so far as to reject the legislation in its entirety because of the inclusion 
of gender, it is possible that that the Congressmen actually endorsed the practice 
of gender discrimination, or at least turned a blind eye towards it. When Title 
VII was enacted, the country, or at least the majority of its leaders, had finally 
acknowledged that racial discrimination was wrong. However, gender 
discrimination was still common, and overwhelmingly accepted. Societal 
perceptions of working women and their abilities have significantly advanced 
since that time. If views of gender discrimination have changed, it is important 
to question whether the gender BFOQ defense needs to be altered, or even 
eliminated, to reflect these less discriminatory beliefs. 
VI.  DO REAL GENDER DIFFERENCES SUPPORT THE BFOQ DEFENSE? 
The BFOQ defense is rooted in the belief that some very real and 
unavoidable differences exist between women and men that can cause one 
 
 216. Id. at 2556 (statement of Rep. Celler). 
 217. See supra, note 11 (As noted, gender was not even included as a protected classification 
within the original construction of Title VII. It was added at the last minute by a Congressman 
hoping to prevent passage of Title VII). 
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gender to be better equipped for a position than the other. Furthermore, in 
providing a gender-based BFOQ defense, but not one based upon race, Congress 
has suggested that gender differences are either more significant or more 
genuine than those based upon race. To determine whether the BFOQ's 
authorization of gender-based hiring are appropriate, it is important to consider 
whether real gender differences do exist and, if they do, whether they are innate 
or learned traits. Certainly, it is not an uncommon belief that with all other 
variables being equal, a candidate of one gender may be better equipped for 
some positions than a candidate of the opposite gender. This belief is neither as 
common nor as acceptable, however, when the two equal candidates are of 
different races. There is a widespread belief that men and women are innately 
different and the BFOQ provisions further validate and promote this sentiment 
by conveying that men and women are, at times, unequally qualified for certain 
employment opportunities. While the notion of innate differences between 
women and men is certainly widespread, is it arguable whether this belief is 
actually accurate and well-founded. It may, instead, be based on false and 
outdated stereotypes persisting from earlier times of rampant gender 
discrimination and significant hiring inequities. 
Although a BFOQ defense cannot legally be based upon stereotypes, it is 
questionable which gender differences attributing to BFOQs are real and which 
differences are, in reality, only perceived due to pervasive stereotypes. 
Countless studies have undertaken the examination of the differences between 
men and women, some finding statistical differences in skill sets, emotional 
traits, and cognitive processes.218 Though gender differences are measured in 
many experiments, it is still unclear whether such differences are real, or if some 
other factor is causing performance differences. This determination is especially 
difficult since some studies find no differences after outside variables are 
controlled for, while others still find significant differences between the sexes.219 
Nevertheless, the following discussion examines the generalizations that can be 
made. 
A. Measured Gender Differences 
Men and women do exhibit some differences that could be relevant to their 
employability or suitability for certain positions. One particular focus of 
research has been on men's independence versus women's interdependence. 
Studies show that women experience more relationship-linked emotions and are 
more attuned to others' relationships.220 Women focus more on personal 
relationships, while men focus on tasks and on connections with large groups.221 
Furthermore, "men gravitate disproportionately to jobs that enhance inequalities 
(prosecuting attorney, corporate advertising); women gravitate to jobs that 
reduce inequalities (public defender, advertising work for a charity)."222 Studies 
examining gender and communication also show differences between men's and 
 
 218. DAVID G. MYERS, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY, 180–97 (7th ed. 2002). 
 219. See infra Part VI. 
 220. Supra note 218, at 179–80. 
 221. Id. at 180. 
 222. Id. 
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women's communication styles. Whereas men tend to be directive, task-focused 
leaders, women are social leaders who focus on team spirit.223 Men place a 
higher priority on winning, getting ahead, and dominating others.224 Though 
men and women rarely score differently on intelligence tests overall, men 
demonstrate better spatial and mathematical reasoning abilities, while women 
perform better on tasks of verbal memory and distinguishing similar objects.225 
Not surprisingly, measured differences correlate with commonly held 
stereotypes of the sexes, making it difficult to know whether these findings are 
the result of genetic dispositions or socialization. 
B. Stereotypes May be Causing these Differences 
Although some studies find differences between males and females, these 
findings may be partially due to outside factors rather than actual 
dissimilarities. Studies have consistently shown that gender-based stereotypes 
regularly cause women to underperform or perform inaccurately.226 The 
phenomenon known as the Pygmalion effect can arise when an individual 
performs better or worse, based upon the expectations of others.227 In this 
process, other people's expectations are internalized by the individual, and he or 
she performs in accordance with those expectations. This effect has been 
extensively observed in testing situations where one group is expected to 
perform better or worse than another.228 Given that most people unknowingly 
employ stereotyped assumptions based upon male and female abilities, this 
effect could easily trigger test results that measure differences in the 
performance of male and female subjects. 
Furthermore, in what is known as a stereotype threat situation, impaired 
performance results from an individual's fear that his or her performance will 
confirm an existing stereotype of a group to which he or she belongs.229 
Countless studies have documented gender differences when subjects have been 
informed that one gender performs better on the task at hand. For example, in 
one study men and women with similar math backgrounds were given a math 
test.230 When informed that the two genders were expected to perform equally 
on the test, no gender differences were found.231 However, when told that men 
normally scored higher, women's test scores dropped dramatically.232 In another 
 
 223. Id. at 183. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Diane F. Halpern, Sex Differences in Cognitive Abilities, 292 (3d ed. 2000). 
 226. Mara Cardinu et al., Why Do Women Underperform Under Stereotype Threat? Evidence for the 
Role of Negative Thinking, 16 PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, 572, 572–578 (2005). See also Gender Stereotypes 
Can Affect Men's and Women's Test Performance in Math, Study Shows, Sept. 25, 2006 (available at 
http://www.nyu.edu/public.affairs/releases/detail/1207). 
 227. GARY P. LATHAM, WORK MOTIVATION: HISTORY, THEORY, RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 214–15 
(Sage Publications, Inc., 2007). 
 228. Id. 
 229. See MYERS, supra note 218, at 344–45. 
 230. Id. 
 231. Id. 
 232. Id. 
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study, men and women university students were given a math test.233 When the 
women tested alongside other women, they scored significantly better than 
those testing with men.234 These findings can easily be translated to the 
employment context. Since gender stereotypes seem to permeate most 
workplaces, it is possible that in performance-based evaluations, women may 
underperform. This underperformance should be even more prevalent in male 
dominated areas, or in positions were women feel they are not the preferred 
gender.235 Moreover, numerous studies have found that when the effects of 
stereotypes are controlled for, women's test scores are no different than those of 
men.236 Therefore, if gender differences are measured, it is still unclear if outside 
factors, such as the Pygmalion effect or stereotype threat, are at play. The fact 
that commonly accepted gender differences sometimes trigger performance 
disparities should concern those who support the BFOQ defense, or argue for its 
expansion. Furthermore, even if these gender differences are accepted as 
accurate reflections of the participant's skills and behaviors, we must question 
whether any of the differences are significant or important enough to permit 
gender-based hiring procedures. 
C. It is Unclear Whether Measured Differences are Innate or Socially Learned 
Even if we accept that differences do exist between men and women, it still 
remains unclear whether such disparities result from innate or socially learned 
behaviors. This debate over whether behaviors, skills, and traits are ascertained 
primarily through nature or nurture has created what has been deemed a "bitter 
divide" in academia, with no clear consensus of belief.237 For those trying to 
understand whether the BFOQ defense is harmful, however, this is an important 
debate. While some scholars contend that men and women are innately 
different, others maintain that any real differences result from the socialization 
that occurs after birth.238 If measured differences between women and men are 
the result of socialization, the stereotypes that cause this socialization (which the 
BFOQ, at times, validates) further accentuate and prolong these gender 
differences. Thus, if gender differences are learned, there is a very real concern 
 
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. 
 235. Of course, these stereotypes would also cause men to underperform in female dominated 
areas. 
 236. See MYERS, supra note 218, at 344–45. See also Michael Johns et al., Knowing is Half the Battle, 
16 PSYCHOLOGY SCIENCE, 175, 175–179 (2005) (finding that when women were not informed of the 
stereotype threat they performed worse than men on a test, but when informed of the threat they did 
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 237. Matt Crenson, Nature Versus Nurture Divides Academia: Some See Merit in Saying Biology may 
have Role in Gender Inequalities, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 28, 2005, available at 
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; Steven Pinker, Why Nature and Nurture Won't Go Away, DÆDALUS (2004) (available at 
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 238. See generally Kingsley R. Brown, Sex and Temperament in Modern Society: A Darwinian View of 
the Glass Ceiling and the Gender Gap, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 971 (1995); ROBERT PLOMIN, GENETICS AND 
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BRAIN SCIENCES 373 (1991). 
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that the BFOQ defense may be promoting differences, preserving the status quo, 
and prolonging gender discrimination. The theory of socialization is supported 
by strong research, with findings that most, if not all differences result from 
learned behaviors.239 
It is indisputable that men and women are socialized to take on gender-
specific roles, as gender stereotyping permeates all aspects of life. From the 
moment that we enter the world we are taught the way to act, the tasks to do, 
and the jobs to choose. Divisions of labor and responsibility in the home and 
professional world teach us the proper way in which to act and interact. This, of 
course, results in men more often using and developing more stereotypical 
masculine skills and women perfecting more stereotypical feminine skills. 
Socialization creates a cycle in which the current gender-role stereotypes are 
taught and internalized from generation to generation.240 If the BFOQ defense 
allows employers to hire based upon stereotypical notions of gender differences, 
the theory of socialization illustrates how harmful the defense may be. If society 
internalizes legally protected gender-role divisions, the BFOQ may be furthering 
the cycle of gender inequality. 
D. Employment Opportunities are Not Equal 
Regardless of whether the presumed differences are due to innate 
differences or social stereotypes, it is undeniable that women fair far worse in 
their employment opportunities. Women, as a group, are significantly less likely 
to be found in high ranking, high prestige, and high paying positions. Though 
Title VII, the supposed equalizer, has been in place for over forty years, women 
still earn only 74 percent of what men earn.241 While some rightfully argue that 
other variables are at play in this figure, research finds that those variables 
cannot fully account for this large of a gap.242 Overall, men do have higher levels 
of education and more experience in the labor market.243 Nevertheless, several 
studies aimed at isolating the effects of productivity-related factors, such as 
education and time spent in the labor market, show that 25 to 50 percent of the 
26 percent pay gap cannot be explained by such factors.244 Furthermore, it has 
been suggested that as much as 13 of the 26 percent pay gap can be attributed to 
gender discrimination.245 Title VII was enacted to fight the prevalent 
discrimination in the country's labor market, and requires gender-neutral hiring 
practices in this endeavor. However, when the BFOQ permits gender 
discriminatory hiring in certain circumstances, this may in fact decrease the 
statute's fighting power. 
 
 239. See generally Brown, supra note 238. 
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 243. See Murray, supra note 241. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. 
MANLEY__FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:43:47 PM 
 THE BFOQ DEFENSE 203 
The risks inherent in the approval of a gender-based BFOQ are increasingly 
evident if one believes that gender differences are caused, even in part, by 
socialization based on existing stereotypes. A federal statute, such as Title VII, 
that allows employers to utilize gender-based hiring sends a message that at 
times, society, or at least its leaders, permits and agrees with gender 
discrimination. By allowing employers to exclusively hire men as prison guards 
and women as nurses, an underlying message surfaces that men are strong and 
powerful (and women are weak and unfit to act as prison guards) and that 
women are better caretakers and nurturers (and men are unfit for caretaking 
roles). A BFOQ defense that permits such gender-based hiring may only 
encourage and prolong these harmful stereotypes. 
E. Gender Differences in the Privacy Context 
Although it may be unclear whether qualification differences between 
women and men are real or perceived, in the privacy context, such skill 
differences become irrelevant. When a BFOQ is cited due to privacy concerns, it 
is not because of perceived gender-based abilities, but is based upon the gender 
of the applicant alone. In other words, when an employer partakes in 
discriminatory hiring due to privacy, it rejects applicants of the wrong gender 
precisely because of their gender, not due to a lack of skills or traits associated 
with their gender. For example, when employers argue for privacy-based 
BFOQs to permit the hiring of a female nurse for the intimate care of female 
patients it is not because of the nurse's superior caretaking skills nor the 
stereotype that she can provide more nurturing care, but is argued solely upon 
the fact that she is a woman. Accordingly, in the privacy context, physiological 
gender differences exclusive of any gender-role stereotypes really do seem to 
matter. Noticeably, courts have supported this belief.246 Therefore, arguments 
that men and women are no different often fall on deaf ears. 
VII.  SHOULD THE BFOQ DEFENSE STILL BE AVAILABLE? 
Although Title VII only permits gender-based hiring in a very narrow 
subset of circumstances, it still expressly allows some gender discrimination to 
occur. Strong arguments exist both for and against the BFOQ. The most 
frequently cited opposition to the BFOQ centers around the perception that the 
defense is harmful to women. However, as later discussed, some evidence 
contradicts this assumption. While some contend that the BFOQ defense should 
be expanded to conform to societal values and actual court decisions that accept 
gender-based hiring, on the other end are those who maintain that the BFOQ 
should be completely abolished because it results in the subordination of 
women and the prolongation of gender stereotypes. In the middle of these two 
polar opinions are two more moderate views. Some believe that the defense is 
absolutely essential for the workability of Title VII, and should stay exactly as is. 
Finally, some scholars argue that the defense should be narrowed to permit only 
the most essential cases of discrimination. 
 
 246. See, e.g., Backus v. Baptist Med. Ctr., 510 F. Supp. 1191 (E.D. Ark. 1981); Fesel v. Masonic 
Home of Delaware, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 1346 (D. Del. 1978), aff'd, 591 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1979). 
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A. Arguments Supporting the BFOQ Defense 
Several arguments supporting the BFOQ defense, founded in different 
schools of thought, offer convincing justifications that favor this defense. The 
sheer fact that the BFOQ exception was suggested, accepted, and placed on the 
books attests to the fact that many individuals believed in its legitimacy and 
necessity. Title VII expressly states that the BFOQ defense is permitted only 
when "reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular 
business. . . ."247 The words of the statute inform readers that the framers 
believed in its necessity. 
Economists often support the BFOQ defense, finding that it is needed for 
the efficient functioning of the economy. Accordingly, economists oppose the 
inefficiency that results from requirements that employers must equally hire 
both men and women, no matter the cost, for positions that customers would 
prefer one gender to fill.248 Some economists argue for the elimination of Title 
VII completely, or alternatively, for an expansion of the BFOQ to further cater to 
customer preferences.249 They maintain that permitting a BFOQ based upon 
customer preference would be more efficient overall because customers seek out 
their preferences regardless of the law. Thus, permitting a BFOQ defense would 
avert wasted efforts; it would prevent customers from wasting valuable time 
and effort seeking businesses that suit their preferences and prevent employers 
from wasting time, resources, and money attempting to circumvent the law. 
Finally, business owners and pro-business advocates argue that employers 
should have the right to run their businesses as they see fit, including hiring 
whomever they deem appropriate. Employers further argue they should have a 
right to staff their businesses with employees they choose and to increase profits 
and popularity by employing whomever their customers prefer. If businesses 
are not given complete control over their hiring decisions, employers believe 
that they should at least be offered an affirmative defense when gender-based 
hiring is a substantial factor in their success. 
Though arguments against the BFOQ typically focus upon its detrimental 
affects on women, supporters respond that it permits discrimination against 
men as well. A consideration of the most common situations where the BFOQ is 
permitted illustrates that the majority of circumstances actually encourage the 
hiring of female employees. Certainly within the commercial sex industry, 
consisting of strip clubs, gentlemen's clubs, escort services, and sexually explicit 
men's magazines, nearly all businesses cater to men through the employment of 
females. A BFOQ is allowable within that sex appeal arena, permitting 
employers to discriminate against men in hiring, because the essence of most sex 
trade businesses is to sell sexual titillation to heterosexual men, which is 
triggered by the sex appeal of women. While there are some sex trade 
businesses that cater to women or homosexual men, they remain only a small 
 
 247. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (2000). 
 248. See, e.g., RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT 
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 249. See EPSTEIN, supra note 248, at 299–309. 
MANLEY__FMT1.DOC 1/21/2009  12:43:47 PM 
 THE BFOQ DEFENSE 205 
portion of the sex industry.250 Thus, within the majority of commercial sex 
companies, men will be the ones discriminated against in hiring. 
Additionally, within the privacy field, it is much more likely for employers 
to discriminate in favor of women. Due to society's double standard of 
permitting women to view males, but often renouncing mens' viewing of 
females, women will likely be hired disproportionably more often based on 
privacy concerns. Privacy-based BFOQs favor women, in part, due to the fact 
that women are more likely to request female caretakers for their intimate care. 
Thus, forbidding the BFOQ gender-based hiring that favors women would 
likely result in two consequences: (1) a reduction in women's employment 
within these positions if employers are forced to fill some of the positions with 
men, and (2) the diminishing of these job opportunities all together as some 
businesses will fail because of their inability to cater to client demands and/or 
privacy concerns. In view of this, a strong argument can be made for the 
continuation of the BFOQ defense, given that it may actually be helping, not 
harming women by providing an increase in employment opportunities. 
Furthermore, without the current allowances of the BFOQ defense, 
women's privacy concerns would be disregarded. Women, on the whole, are 
much more likely to experience discomfort with cross-sex viewing or touching. 
For some individuals, privacy invasions may cause serious psychological and 
emotional harm. Ordinarily, courts have been sympathetic to these concerns, 
often permitting gender-based hiring or staffing. However, with the eradication 
of the BFOQ defense, employers would be strictly forbidden from continuing 
this practice. Accordingly, patients would, at times, have no option other than to 
be subjected to cross-sex viewing or touching. Given that privacy is a value 
deeply held by the majority of Americans, this should cause doubt for the 
workability of the full elimination of the BFOQ defense. 
Although many complain of the harm the BFOQ defense causes women, as 
later discussed, some feminists argue in favor of the BFOQ defense, even when 
it places women in positions of commodification.251 Those deemed as liberal 
feminists view commodification as a means to an end and assert that women 
should be empowered to choose for themselves whether to sell their sex, or sex 
appeal, as a commodity.252 To further allow women this option, some liberal 
feminists argue for expanding the current BFOQ exceptions. They contend that 
occupations in which women are commodified often provide higher wages than 
those women could otherwise obtain.253 In some circumstances, women may 
even use these more lucrative jobs as a means to rise out of low-income, dead-
end employment and pursue better opportunities. In support of this argument, 
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Melissa Ditmore of the Network of Sex Projects testified before the U.N., "Many 
people opt for sex work because it is less degrading, better paying and provides 
more freedom than other available options."254 Many feminists also argue 
against efforts to eradicate the BFOQ because they believe that women do not 
need to be paternalistically protected from commodification. Some economists 
also follow this line of reasoning, arguing that a more efficient marketplace is 
created when women have the choice to make money by whatever means they 
see fit, including the selling of their sexual appeal.255 Clearly, multiple 
arguments support the continuation (or even extension) of the BFOQ defense. 
B. Arguments Opposing the BFOQ Defense 
Arguments opposing the BFOQ defense are also plentiful. The main 
concern with the defense stems from the negative effects discriminatory hiring 
has on the employment opportunities of the excluded and included sex.256 
Gender-based hiring is harmful because it limits the types of positions that 
individuals may apply for and fill. Furthermore, given the historical roles of 
women and men in the workplace, there is a heightened concern that gender-
based hiring will have a disproportionately more detrimental effect on women. 
Positions typically associated with men are likely to be higher paying and to 
have higher prestige than positions associated with females. As such, without 
gender discrimination laws, men would more often be hired for higher pay, 
higher prestige positions such as businessmen, doctors, lawyers, executives, and 
other higher powered, management positions, while women would more often 
be hired for lower pay, lower prestige positions such as secretaries, child care 
workers, teachers, nurses, and other care-related non-management positions. 
Without employment discrimination laws, job segregation would lead to job 
stratification, and result in lower-status and lower pay employment for 
women.257 Nevertheless, even if sex-based hiring is more likely to harm women 
overall, it will have detrimental effects on men's employment opportunities too, 
especially for men entering into professions historically dominated by females. 
The most significant problem with the BFOQ defense occurs because of the 
validating effect it has on current gender stereotypes. Permitting sexual 
stereotypes reinforces them, allowing them to carry on far into the future. 
What's more, legal reinforcement sends a much stronger message than social 
reinforcement. By its very nature, the BFOQ defense contributes to gender 
stereotyping by legitimating gender discrimination. Authors Katherine Bartlett 
and Deborah Rhode acknowledge this concern, explaining: 
On the one hand, it may be reasonable to hire based on sex when the 
employment at issue implicates privacy or therapeutic interests that are gender 
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related and the preference does not derive from harmful stereotypes. . . . On the 
other hand, applying the BFOQ exception in this context would seem to 
perpetuate age-old stereotypes that Title VII was meant to condemn—i.e., 
women's role washing and cleaning up after people, and men's role as the 
skilled professionals.258 
Furthermore, even when discrimination is "based upon accurate 
stereotypes or generalizations, and [is] cost/benefit-justified, [it] nonetheless has 
undesirable social consequences," such as "perpetuat[ing] the social realities that 
make the predictions accurate," "reinforce[ing] biases and other inaccurate 
stereotypes," and "freezing . . . the underlying social reality."259 Even courts have 
recognized this problem: "Is it significant that preferences for privacy from 
members of the opposite sex may be entirely culturally created, and that by 
recognizing such preferences the courts may encourage sex differences at the 
expense of equality in employment?"260 Thus, there is a very real concern that a 
BFOQ defense may be solidifying gender stereotypes into law. The possibility 
that the very statute meant to alleviate gender discrimination may actually 
perpetuate the discrimination is undoubtedly troubling. 
Furthermore, some scholars believe that the areas in which the BFOQ is 
currently permitted are illegitimate based upon the requirements of the 
defense.261 As discussed previously, the case holdings on the BFOQ defense are 
inconsistent and, at times, difficult to reconcile. In privacy cases, courts often 
allow customer preferences to direct BFOQ defenses, but other courts have 
stated that customer preferences can never permit a BFOQ. Furthermore, 
scholars argue that, at the core, almost every BFOQ defense is based upon 
customer preferences.262 Since customer preference is expressly prohibited as a 
motive for gender discriminatory hiring, some argue that nearly all BFOQ 
defenses should be prohibited.263 Additionally, some scholars argue that the 
privacy concerns of patients or clients do not meet the main criterion of a valid 
BFOQ, since the essence of the business would not be undermined without 
gender-based hiring. What's more, Title VII is meant to change customer 
preferences, not cater to them.264 Because these scholars do not find such 
motives legitimate, they argue for either a severe limitation or full elimination of 
the defense. 
Opponents of the BFOQ cite the additional concern that the BFOQ defense 
is founded upon normative assumptions, many of which are outdated. Author 
Sharon M. McGown suggests that courts employ the following normative, 
paternalistic assumptions in order to permit BFOQs: (1) the likelihood that 
physical and sexual assault is prevalent in environments of confinement; (2) 
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cross-sex observation causes a "dignity harm" for the individual observed; (3) 
sexual modesty is the mark of a civilized society; and (4) sex-segregation is a 
necessary for any effective rehabilitation program.265 Each of the above 
normative justifications is then followed by further normative assumptions. For 
example, when courts maintain that physical and sexual assault against women 
is likely to occur in environments of confinement, McGown finds that they then 
make further assumptions that women are too weak for certain jobs and that 
only women are sexually vulnerable.266 McGown notes that within courts' 
framing of BFOQ cases based upon the dignity harms from cross-sex 
observation, courts make judgments that modesty, especially women's, deserves 
protection and that cross-sex observation is particularly harmful.267 
It is also concerning that in justifying BFOQ defenses, courts sometimes 
make decisions based upon stereotyped assumptions that are unfounded.268 
Often, these normative assumptions further preserve the status quo of 
inequality and involve the paternalistic treatment of women, both of which are 
motives Title VII aims to prevent. For those opposed to the BFOQ defense, this 
remains a serious complaint. 
Though many BFOQ opponents agree that the defense should be restricted, 
they disagree over how severe further limitations should be.269 Some opponents 
maintain that the BFOQ should be completely eliminated because of the 
multiple problems involved in the BFOQ's authorization of discriminatory 
hiring. Other opponents argue that abolishment of the defense is impractical, 
but that it should be greatly restricted.270 The question of what should be 
prohibited and what should be permitted is not an easy one to answer. Some 
maintain that the only allowable BFOQ should be that of authenticity, because it 
really is necessary for the believability of certain roles. Others are slightly more 
lenient, finding that a privacy-based BFOQ defense should still be permitted in 
the limited situations where a business would truly fail without discriminatory 
hiring.271 Those with a more strict approach often find that Title VII expressly 
forbids BFOQ defenses because all motives, even authenticity, are based upon 
customer preference.272 This approach, therefore, renders the BFOQ exception 
useless and prohibits any hiring based upon gender. 
C. The Author's Stance 
Strong arguments weigh both for and against the continuation of the BFOQ 
defense and its current parameters. It is unquestionable that gender-
discriminatory hiring practices do inflict some losses on both sexes. Gender-
based hiring restricts individuals' employment opportunities, sometimes forcing 
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qualified applicants into lower paid positions. Discriminatory hiring also 
validates and prolongs gender stereotypes, instead of eradicating them. Often, 
this is done in a manner that is subordinates and harms women. Furthermore, 
most successful BFOQ motives are, at their core, founded on customer 
preference. The very statute with an objective of eradicating stereotypes, at 
times, inconsistently endorses them. 
Endorsement of any law that results in such a significant assortment of 
problems should cause hesitation. After careful consideration, I conclude that 
elimination of the BFOQ defense is not the solution for this slew of problems. 
The defense is not only valuable, but also absolutely essential, for the realistic 
functioning of Title VII. Accordingly, I argue that the statute should remain fully 
intact. Although inconsistencies within case law support arguments to expand 
the defense, any expansion to further cater to discriminatory customer 
preferences and stereotypical impressions is dangerous, regardless of its 
efficiency.273 
Although the eradication of gender discrimination should be a top priority, 
it is not paramount. We live in a society in which gender roles are so deeply 
engrained within our conceptions and understanding of appropriateness of 
social interactions, that BFOQ defenses are, at times, an inevitable necessity. 
Within the privacy context, the elimination of gender-based hiring is both 
unrealistic and undesirable.274 While gender differences resulting from 
stereotypes and socialization are alarming, it is naïve to argue that such 
distinctions are never necessary. 
Even though this validation of gender discrimination causes discomfort, I, 
like most of society, am willing to accept that consequence here. To be effective 
and operative, laws must interact with and accept some shared societal values. 
Consequently, any gender discrimination statute that provides absolutely no 
appreciation for the values of privacy and rehabilitation would be unworkable 
and ineffective. Thus, I find that the elimination of the BFOQ defense is an 
undesirable and unworkable approach to further reducing gender 
discrimination. 
Some may argue that this opinion is irresponsible or inattentive to the 
eradication of discrimination. At this note's outset, I may have agreed. After all, 
current BFOQ jurisprudence allows both stereotypes and customer preference to 
dictate the law and furthers discriminatory notions by allowing them to legally 
subsist. Considering that society felt similarly tolerant of racial discrimination 
only forty years ago, it is important to be cognizant of the situation's parallels. 
Beliefs that African-Americans and whites are inherently different, although not 
generally accepted today, were prevalent before the enactment of Title VII. Since 
then, racial discrimination has significantly decreased, in large part, as a result 
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of initially unpopular legislation that fully forbid racial discrimination. This 
result provides some support to arguments for a complete ban of gender-based 
hiring. Social beliefs of gender differences have decreased since the passage of 
Title VII, much like racial differences, yet they have not disappeared. With even 
stricter gender discrimination laws, some argue, discrimination will further 
decline. However, I do not find the complete eradication of gender differences 
desirable, as I do with race. There are inherent differences between males and 
females, physiological and otherwise, which are not present between the 
races.275 
At some point, the desirability of a BFOQ defense turns to a normative 
argument in which we must question the value of recognizing gender 
differences. Although most would agree that the acknowledgement of racial 
differences is inappropriate, the desirability of gender differences is not as clear 
cut. We must balance the right to equal employment opportunities against the 
rights of consumer privacy and both employer and employee autonomy. 
Lawmakers must mediate between these competing interests and attempt to 
achieve the most appropriate balance. Often, lawmaking is a process of selecting 
the lesser of two evils, and this process is undoubtedly apparent with the BFOQ 
defense. Accordingly, I believe that the defense, as currently written, 
accomplishes its desired goals. The exception, as is, forbids most forms of 
discrimination, but still permits gender-based hiring in narrow circumstances, 
such as privacy and rehabilitation.276 Consideration of the legislative history 
leads me to believe this is precisely what the framers had in mind. Admittedly, 
the defense is not without serious fault. But, in light of the balancing of interests 
it must achieve, I see no superior alternative. 
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The BFOQ defense is not without significant downfalls. It has been 
interpreted inconsistently. Courts have allowed community norms and 
stereotypic beliefs to infiltrate their decisions. At times, the defense even 
operates to the detriment of both women and men. Furthermore, judicial 
acceptance of gender differences promotes and sustains gender stereotypes 
using a statute meant to eradicate them. These faults are both relevant and 
important. Nevertheless, no matter how troubling the downfalls are, elimination 
of the BFOQ defense is not the appropriate solution. Without the BFOQ, Title 
VII would not remain a fully functional statute. In reality, society and its leaders 
have decided that some values trump the importance of eradicating gender 
discrimination, and the BFOQ is needed to protect those values. Consequently, 
regardless of the various problems inherent in the availability of a BFOQ 
exception, the defense should remain as it has been for the past 44 years. 
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